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JANET BLISS'S STORY1
Janet Bliss had a high school education and married in 1963 when
she was twenty-one years old. Her total paid employment experience from
that time until 1982 consisted of briefperiods of clerical work and part-
time babysitting. Janet stayed at home raising their three children. Her hus-
band Hal, in contrast, earned a law degree in 1967, and practiced law
continuously since that time.
Hal and Janet moved to the Phoenix, Arizona area in 1967, when he
finished law school In 1973, Hal moved out of the family home for several
weeks, returning only when he became ill. Over the next few years, Hal
established a pattern of moving out for weeks or months then returning for
short periods only to move out again. By 1982, he was living with another
woman and paying the expenses for their extra-marital household. During
his repeated absences Hal would deposit money in his and Janet's joint
checking account twice a month. By 1982 he was depositing approximately
$2,400 per month.
Throughout the marriage, Hal handled the family finances. Typically,
he gave Janet a small cash allowance to pay for household expenses, but
insisted she ask his permission to write checks. Hal never discussed their
finances with Janet; when she asked questions, his usual response was to get
angry or tell her she was too stupid to understand
Despite her husband' unfaithfulness, Janet continued to hope for a
reconciliation. However, in 1982, Hal initiated divorce proceedings. The
divorce decree granted on January 28, 1983 apparently was delayed from
December 1982 in order to permit the parties to file a joint tax return for
1982.2
1. The facts that follow are taken from the Tax Court opinion and the trial transcript
of Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1993), aid, 59 F.3d 374 (2d
Cir. 1995). The author acted as counsel to Janet Bliss, and the facts are recounted
here with her permission.
2. Internal Revenue Code § 7703(a) provides:
(1)the determination of whether an individual is married [for the purpose
of filing a joint return] shall be made as of the dose of his taxable year;
except that if his spouse dies during the taxable year such determination
shall be made as of the time of such death; and
(2)an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance shall not be considered as married.
I.R.C. § 7703(a) (1994). Prior to 1986, substantially the same language was con-
tained in then-I.R.C. § 143.
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Tax preparation in this family was a male prerogative, as it had been
in Janet's own fairly traditional family. She received the clear message while
growing up that men were primarily responsible for work and financial
matters. Typically, Hal would prepare, or have prepareae the tax return
and bring it to Janet for signature. In some years, she signed blank returns.
Until 1983, after her divorce, Janet had never prepared her own tax
return. Even during the ten years from 1973 through the divorce, when
Hal was more frequently away than at home, Janet had no overall knowl-
edge of her husband's finances. She nonetheless routinely signed their joint
returns.
Like many other women caught up in divorce proceedings, Janet Bliss
hired a well-known divorce lawyer, and trusted him to "take care of every-
thing"for her. In some respects, her divorce lawyer now substituted for her
errant husband, becoming the man in her life who was responsible for
taking care of financial matters. Janet herself never examined any of the
documents produced during discovery for the divorce proceedings, other than
the draft separation agreement itself.
The 1982 tax return, signed and filed after Janet and Hal were
already divorcea neglected to report as gross income some $33,000 that Hal
had received from his law firm. The return classified the $33,000 as a
loan, rather than as income.3 Without the loan, Hal's reported gross income
was approximately $72,000; if the loan had been included as income, his
gross income would have been about $115,000, and the tax due more than
$15,000 higher than the amount shown on the return that was filed.
Janet's well-known divorce lawyer, on whom she reliea failed to detect the
understatement of income. He testified that he had determined that Hal's
actual income for 1982 was on the order of $72,000, because of a precipi-
tous decline in Hal' billable hours from the previous year, when Hal had
earned $114, 000.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") eventually discovered the under-
statement of income, and issued a deficiency notice to both Janet and Hal.
Janet, by this time having put her life back together following the divorce,
had earned a college degree and was enrolled in law schooL She petitioned
3. Because the borrower's receipt of loan proceeds is contemporaneous with the
assumption of an obligation to repay the loan principal, a loan normally results in
no net accession to wealth and hence no gross income. See Commissioner v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 211-14 (1990) (holding that
refundable customer deposits were loans and therefore not taxable as income to the
utility company on receipt).
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the Tax Court for relief under the innocent spouse statute, It?. C.
9 6013(e),' and a trial was held in December 1989. At the trial, Hal
testified for the IRS. Some three and a halfyears later, in August 1993, the
Tax Court finally handed down its decision in the case. It held for the IRS,
on the grounds that, although Janet might not actually have known that
Hal was understating his income, she had "reason to know" of the under-
statement of tax.5 Two years later, in July 1995, the U.S. Court ofAppeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed. During the entire time that the case was
pending, the IRS apparently made no attempt to collect the deficiency from
HaZ even though he was earning substantial income and accumulating
assets, and even though his actions were the cause of the problem.7
INTRODUCTION
Janet Bliss is typical of the more than 435 people who have had
their claims for innocent spouse relief determined by the courts since
1971, when such relief first became available.' Like 393 of the petition-
ers, or ninety percent, she is a woman. More than ninety percent of the
4. I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994). For a discussion of the specific requirements for relief
under § 6013(e), see infra text accompanying notes 100-121.
5. Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1993), affid, 59 E3d 374 (2d Cir.
1995). A case involving remarkably similar facts, including the husband's domina-
tion of business affairs and the wife's modest lifestyle, was recently decided in favor
of the petitioning wife. Smith v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2887 (1994).
The Smith case, however, did not involve a divorce actually in progress at the time
the tax return was signed (the couple had separated in 1986; tax returns at issue
were for 1981, 1982 and 1984). It did, however, involve a wife who, unlike Janet
Bliss, already had a master's degree and substantial experience in various kinds of
employment. Smith, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2888-89.
6. Bliss v. Commissioner, 59 E3d 374 (2d Cir. 1995).
7. The failure to pursue collection action against Hal also conflicts with a stated IRS
policy to defer collection action against a putative innocent spouse and to pursue it
against a culpable spouse. See IrraRA RnVENUE MANUAL (Administration) (CCH)
§ 53(10)(11).22(2) (Jan. 14, 1991); see also Marjorie A. O'Connell, Innocent Spouse
Rules Can Avoid Unexpected Liability on Joint Returns with Former Spouse, 17 TAX'N
FOR lAw. 226, 228-29 (1989). The IRS's choice in Janet Bliss's case to pursue a
relatively poor, largely "innocent" ex-wife, however, while not taking collection
action against an ex-husband who can be found and who has current income, is not
an isolated instance. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and
Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REv. 317,
323-24 (1989).
8. The statistics in this paragraph derive from a review of all relevant cases available on
Westlaw as of June 30, 1995. Spreadsheets containing the statistical analysis were
prepared by my research assistant, Michelle Koelle, and are on fie with the author.
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cases are initially heard in Tax Court,9 and at the trial level, petitioners
win slightly less than twenty-five percent of the cases.10 The most
common explanation for denying relief is that the spouse asserting
innocence "had reason to know" of the understatement of tax on the
return.11 "Reason to know" was the basis for failing to qualify for inno-
cent spouse status in approximately fifty-five percent of all cases decided
adversely to the petitioner, with no significant difference between male
and female petitioners.
The innocent spouse statute purports to relieve one spouse of the
otherwise applicable joint-return liability' 2 for the other spouse's tax
deficiencies, provided the spouse asserting innocence can establish,
among other things, that she13 did not know or have reason to know of
the understatement of tax on the joint return.14 The standard that the
courts have generally applied in determining whether a spouse alleging
9. Upon receipt of the statutory notice of deficiency, a taxpayer who wishes to contest
the deficiency in court has two alternatives. The taxpayer may file a petition with
the Tax Court within 90 days from the issuance of the deficiency notice for a
"redetermination" of the asserted deficiency. Assessment and collection (but not the
accumulation of interest and, if applicable, penalties) will be barred until the
decision of the Tax Court becomes final. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1994). Alternatively, the
taxpayer may pay the deficiency as asserted by the IRS and then file a claim for a
refund. If the refund daim is denied, the taxpayer must file suit for the refund in
the appropriate U.S. District Court or in the Court of Federal Claims. I.R.C.
§ 7422 (1994). Note that the Tax Court may be the only viable option for taxpay-
ers who cannot afford to pay the asserted deficiency up front. See JAMES W.
QuiGGLE & LipmAN REDMAN, PROCaDuE BEFo E THE INTERNAL RE EN E SERVIcE
145-148 (6th ed. 1984).
10. At the trial court level, men were granted innocent spouse relief in 10 of 42 cases
(23.8%), while women were granted relief in 92 of 393 cases (23.4%). On appeal,
16 women and no men were granted relief, and the trial court decisions in favor of
women were reversed in two cases. Therefore, after appeal, 106 of 393 women
(27.0%) were granted relief.
11. See infia text accompanying notes 127-177 for a discussion of the "reason to
know" standard.
12. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994) provides that "if a joint return is made, the tax shall be
computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be
joint and several." For a discussion of the rationale for joint and several liability, see
infra text accompanying notes 73-81.
13. As noted above, slightly more than 90% of all innocent spouse petitioners are
women. Because relatively few men seem to be affected by the statute, and because
many of the issues that are raised by the innocent spouse statute are gender-specific,
this artide refers to those daiming relief as "she."
14. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1994). A similar, but more restrictive provision permits
relief from liability in the case of separate returns filed by spouses in community-
property states. I.R.C. § 66(c) (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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her innocence had reason to know of an understatement of tax on the
return is whether "a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her position at the
time she signed the return could be expected to know that the return
contained a substantial understatement." 15
All too often, however, a judge's view of whether a particular
woman had reason to know of her husband's tax dereliction has little or
nothing to do with the realities of that woman's situation or of the
situation of women in general. In particular, the standard of reasonable
behavior that the courts usually apply in innocent spouse cases, and
especially in those cases that involve traumatic events that might affect
an ordinary woman's pattern of behavior,'6 seems woefully out of touch
with everyday reality. There should be room in federal tax law, as there
now is in other areas of the law, for a fuller, more textured view of real
people's lives and motivations, which do not always mirror the rational
abstractions of the law. As one prescient judge stated in an innocent
spouse case, "[e]ven a tax collector should have some heart." 17
In certain areas of the law, "the man in the Clapham omnibus,""8
that staple of Anglo-American reasonableness and dispassion, is slowly
being made to share legal prominence with newer actors-the reason-
able person or even the reasonable woman. In tort law, the "reasonable
man" has become, apparently in deference to increased sensitivity, the
"reasonable person," even if the attributes of the legal construct making
up such a paragon have not changed. 9 In some areas of law, however,
15. Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 E3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Price v.
Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1989)); Sanders v. United States, 509
F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 300-324 (discussing typical responses to divorce).
17. Dakil v. United States, 496 E2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974).
18. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 KB. 205, 224. The "man of ordi-
nary prudence" was apparently first mentioned in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing.
N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837), and the "prudent and reasonable man"
seems first to have appeared in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng.
Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. Ch. 1856). On the history and content of the "reasonable
man" standard, see generally Ronald K. L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal
Process: a Profile of the 'Reasonable Man," 8 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 311 (1977); Edward
Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial Reality?, 2 LAw & Soc'Y
Rav. 241 (1968); Fleming James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1951); Osborne Reynolds, The Reasonable Man of Negli-
gence Law: A Health Report on the "Odious Creature, "23 OKaA. L. Ray. 410 (1970);
Randy T. Austin, Note, Better Off With the Reasonable Man Dead or The Reasonable
Man Did the Darndest Things, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 479.
19. Although the name of the reasonable actor may have changed from "man" to
"person," the accumulation of case-law situations and precedents that determine
[Vol. 3:421
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the realization that there are gender-specific bearers of reason is gaining
ground. The "reasonable woman" or the "reasonable victim"20 seem to
represent an emerging standard,2' particularly in sexual harassment
cases22 and in cases involving women who kill or injure their battering
or otherwise abusive mates. 23 In other areas of law, such as the law of
fright and the infliction of emotional distress,24 or the state-of-mind
defense that reduces homicide from murder to manslaughter,25 the
outlines of a standard of reasonableness that takes greater cognizance of
the specific attributes of the person involved are beginning to emerge.
These developments, while a welcome departure from the mono-
lithic and male-dominated legal fiction of the past, raise their own
questions. For example, is there only one "reasonable woman," or are
differences of race, class, personal experience, family situation, etc., to
whether a particular actor is to be viewed as having acted reasonably is still made up
largely of factual settings in which the actors and the expected behaviors were
overwhelmingly male. Wendy Parker, The Reasonable Person: a Gendered Concept,
23(2) VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. Rnv. 105, 108-10 (1993).
20. See, e.g., Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 E Supp. 1509, 1516 n.12 (D. Me.
1991) ("reasonable person from the protected group [race, not gender in this case]
of which the alleged victim is a member").
21. See infra text accompanying notes 178-187.
22. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the reason-
able woman standard). Similar positions have been taken by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d
Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit, Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir.
1987), and the Eighth Circuit, Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d
959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding
sexual harassment does not explicitly invoke the "reasonable woman" standard but
rather looks to whether a "reasonable person" would find a particular work environ-
ment hostile or abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
However, the first court of appeals decision relying on Harris appears to require
consideration of the employee's gender. Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 10
F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e consider ... the effect the discriminatory
conduct ... likely would have had on a reasonable employee in her position.")
(emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P2d 548 (Wash. 1977); sources cited infra note
264.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 219-224.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model
Penal Code defines manslaughter as "a homicide which would otherwise be murder
... committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explana-
tion or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he [sic] believes them to be." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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be taken into account?26 And perhaps as important, who is to decide
what the reasonable woman would do in a particular situation-the still
male-dominated judiciary?27 When one looks at any area of law where
reasonableness is a concern, these questions must necessarily be faced.
This Article asks whether the "reasonable woman" should become
the standard for women seeking relief from tax liabilities under the
innocent spouse provision of the I.R.C. and whether an even more
specific standard should be adopted for women who are also going
through divorce or are in similar situations.
Part I of the Article discusses the legislative and judicial history of
the innocent-spouse statute, examining some recent doctrinal splits
among the courts of appeals and between those courts and the U.S. Tax
Court, and focusing on the various aspects of "reasonableness" that the
courts have emphasized in determining whether a woman had reason to
know of a tax understatement. Part II considers the "reasonable wom-
an" concept, particularly as it has evolved in the sexual harassment and
battered women's self-defense cases, and discusses whether the standard
is appropriate in the innocent spouse arena. Part III analyzes the partic-
ular pressures that apply to women in the midst of a divorce or separa-
tion proceeding and discusses the use of a sub-category of "reasonable
women" standard for these women. The Article concludes, first, by
suggesting three remedial steps that would reduce the injustice that is
apparent in joint-return liability under the income-tax laws, as such
liability is applied today: (1) a recognition of the reasonable woman and
her sub-categories by the courts; (2) a liberalization of the innocent
spouse statute by Congress; and (3) the abolition of joint-return liabili-
ty. Second, the Article recognizes that much of such remedial action,
with the possible exception of the abolition of joint-return liability,
might amount to little more than rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic. As one wise non-lawyer put it, ... the master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house. 28
26. For a discussion of conflicts that may arise with the adoption of a "reasonable
woman" standard, see sources cited infra note 201.
27. On the general under-representation of women in the judiciary, see Miriam G.
Cedarbaum, Women on the Federal Bench, 73 B.U. L. Ray. 39 (1993); Sheldon
Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A Lasting Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344
(1981); Sheldon Goldman & Matthew Saronson, Clinton's Nontraditional Judges:
Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDIcATuRE 68 (1994).
28. AUDE Lo.Dw, SIsTRa OUTSIDER 112 (1994).
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I. THE INNOCENT SPOUSE STATUTE2 9
At one extreme, petitioners in the reported innocent spouse cases
are wives with little formal education, a cultural tradition of deferring
to male authority, and no knowledge of either their husbands' business
affairs or any significant aspects of the family finances. At the other,
they are women of substantial wealth, education, and business achieve-
ment who took an active role in family financial decisions.
For example, in Pietromonaco v. Commissioner," the petitioner
Emilia Pietromonaco married her husband Erminio at age eighteen,
soon after she graduated from high school. She remained married for
fifty-two years, until Erminio's death.' She never worked outside the
home, and never obtained any further education. 2 During their mar-
riage, she stayed at home, raised the children, cooked the meals. She let
Erminio handle the money, except for paying for groceries, utility bills,
and the mortgage, which she paid with checks from their joint ac-
count 3 As their daughter described the situation, Erminio cwanted to
be in charge of everything and he really didn't want my mother to be
involved financially or with the business, and I guess she was typical in
being a housewife. She enjoyed that and was content doing that."34
Erminio ran a cash business, a hair salon located some forty miles
from their home.35 He apparently hid income, which he used to pay
29. The innocent spouse statute has been the subject of considerable academic and
practitioner comment. See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, supra note 7; Jerome Borison,
Innocent Spouse Relief a Call for Legislative and Judicial Liberalization, 40 Tx LAw.
819 (1987); James B. Lewis, Innocent Spouse Cases: Comments Inspired by Professor
Borison's Article, 40 TAx LAw. 865 (1987); William J. Minick III, The Innocent
Spouse Doctrine: The Need for Reform and Planning Alternatives in the State of Texas,
66 TAXS 56 (1987); O'Connell, supra note 7; James E. Panny & Marc L. Faust,
The Innocent Spouse Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: In Search of Equity, 32
U. M. mi L. REv. 137 (1977); J. Timothy Philipps & L. Bradford Braford, Even a
Tax Collector Should Have Some Heart: Equitable Relieffor the Innocent Spouse Under
LAC. - 6ox3(e), 8 N. Iu.. U. L. Rnv. 33 (1987); Stephen A. Zorn, Lost Innocence:
the Tax Court and LR.C. g 6o3(e), 48 TAx NoTES 1177 (1990); Lisa Bittan, Note,
The Innocent Spouse Rule: Recent Developments and Proposed Changes, 14 Sw. U. L
REv. 129; Donna Y. Chance, Note, Tax Relief for an Innocent Spouse for Gross
Income Omissions on Income Tax Returns, 7 T. MARs-a.L L. Rv. 300 (1982).
30. Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 E3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1993).
31. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1344.
32. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1344.
33. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1344.
34. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1344.
35. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1344.
1996]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
gambling debts, from the Internal Revenue Service." From what Emilia
could tell, their lifestyle did not reflect any great changes in wealth.
The high points of that lifestyle were hiring a gardener, regular trips for
Emilia to the beauty parlor, the bowling alley, and the cafeteria, and
occasional two-day outings to Las Vegas.3" By the time the IRS got
around to issuing a deficiency notice with respect to the unreported
income, Erminio had been stricken with Alzheimer's disease, and by the
time of the trial in Tax Court, he was incompetent.39 While the trial
court found that Emilia was not an innocent spouse, because of the
"extravagance" of having a part-time gardener and regular hair stylings,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding her to be
exactly the sort of person for whom the innocent spouse statute was
intended.4 °
In Ratana v. Commissioner, 41 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit demonstrated sympathy for a wife who came from a cultural
background that was not part of the American mainstream. The woman
was a Filipina married to a Thai man who worked for the Thai embas-
sy in Washington, but whose major source of income appeared to be
from drug trafficking. She argued that in Thai culture, "a wife submits
to her husband and does not question his demeanor."42 Despite the
wife's tertiary education (she was qualified as a nurse) and her direct
responsibility for paying the household bills, the court found she had
no reason to know of the income her husband had omitted from their
tax returns, except to the extent that such income was and could rea-
sonably be identified as the specific source of the cash allowance he
gave her.43 Similarly, in Aina v. Commissioner,44 a Nigerian wife moved
to the United States with her Nigerian husband. She turned all her
earnings over to her husband, leaving all spending decisions up to
36. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1348.
37. Pietromonaco, 3 F3d at 1344.
38. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1346-47, 1348.
39. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1346-47, 1348.
40. Pietromonaco, 3 E3d at 1347-48.
41. Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 E2d 220 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'g in part and affg in
part 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1980).
42. Ratana, 662 E2d at 222.
43. Ratana, 662 E2d at 225.
44. Aina v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 88 (1987).
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him.4 5 The court granted innocent spouse relief even though the wife
had post-secondary education and considerable experience working
outside the home.
46
The case law is not entirely consistent, however, even with respect
to these archetypal dependent spouses. For example, in Estate of Jack-
son v. Commissioner,47 a wife with only a sixth grade education was
held to have had reason to know of the husband's omitted income,
although her husband made all financial decisions for the family, paid
all the bills, and physically abused her whenever she asked about money
matters."8 She was denied innocent spouse relief, apparently on the basis
that she should have realized that her husband's large cash outlays were
incompatible with the income reported on their joint returns.4 9
When a wife has more education or business experience, her
chances of obtaining innocent spouse relief diminish significantly. For
example, in Hayman v. Commissioner, 5 the petitioner wife had re-
ceived a B.S. degree and was vice president and marketing director for
a large clothing chain.5' Her husband was a promoter of various tax
shelter investments, in which the Haymans themselves invested.52 The
Court -of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirming the Tax Court,
found that Mrs. Hayman had reason to know of understatements of tax
on their joint return attributable to the tax shelter deals, in part at least
because of her "education; her involvement in the family's financial
affairs; [and] her business experience." 53 Although Jacqueline Hayman
apparently spent no more time reviewing the tax return that her hus-
band presented to her than did the less well educated Emilia
Pietromonaco, 54 Mrs. Hayman was charged by the court with a stricter
duty of inquiry than was Mrs. Pietromonaco. Such a distinction may
well be justifiable because there may not be a single "reasonable
45. Aina, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 92.
46. Aina, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 89-92.
47. Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356 (1979).
48. Jackson, 72 T.C. at 359-60.
49. Jackson, 72 T.C. at 361-62.
50. Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1993).
51. Hayman, 992 F.2d at 1258.
52. Hayman, 992 E2d at 1258.
53. Hayman, 992 F.2d at 1262.
54. See Hayman, 942 E2d at 1258 (husband presented tax returns and wife signed
them without understanding them); Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d at
1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1993) (wife signed tax returns "without question").
1996]
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woman" standard, but, rather, multiple standards; 55 nonetheless the
cases do not articulate a rationale for making such distinctions.
In contrast, Anna Friedman was granted innocent spouse status by
the same court that denied it to Hayman. 51 She was held not to have
had reason to know of an understatement of tax on the Friedman's
joint return attributable to her husband's real estate deals, even though
prior to their marriage she had worked as a secretary in his office.57
Friedman, unlike Jacqueline Hayman, had only a high school educa-
tion, and was described by the court as "possessing only a rudimentary
grasp of the simplest tax principles" and as falling far short of the
"sophisticated financial insight necessary to assess the propriety of a
complex individual tax shelter."58
In some cases, the mere fact of being well-off and having ready
access to large sums of money appears to be a substitute for advanced
education or business experience. For example, in Bokum v. Commis-
sioner,59 the wife had only a junior college education and no involve-
ment in her husband's business affairs, other than occasionally giving
him money from her trust fund for his investments.6" Apparently,
neither her husband nor his accountant knew that there had been a tax
understatement. 61 The Tax Court nonetheless held that the wife had
reason to know of the understatement because: (1) the tax preparer
failed to sign his name at the bottom of the return, which, the Tax
Court said, should have alerted her to a possible problem; 62 (2) there
was an arithmetic error in Schedule A of the return;63 and (3) the size
of the Schedule A item at issue-approximately $2 million-should
have alerted her to the need for more inquiry.' The facts of Bokum
indicate that no amount of inquiry, short perhaps of hiring another,
more competent accountant to review the entire return or hiring
55. See infra text accompanying notes 260-261.
56. Friedman v. Commissioner, 53 E3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
57. Friedman, 53 E3d at 526, 532.
58. Friedman, 53 E3d at 530.
59. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990), affid, 992 E2d 1132 (11th Cir.
1993). The court of appeals did not address the reason to know issue, affirming
solely on the basis that it would not be inequitable to hold Mrs. Bokum liable for
the deficiency. Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 1993).
60. She had trust fund income of $120,000-150,000 annually. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 128.
61. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 132.
62. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 147.
63. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 148.
64. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 148.
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investigators to delve into the other spouse's finances65 would have
caused Mrs. Bokum to have had actual knowledge of the
understatement of tax.
If all women behaved the way Emilia Pietromonaco and other less-
educated, less business-experienced petitioners did, then there would be
few questions about whether they were innocent with respect to their
husbands' tax cheating. But Emilia Pietromonaco is no longer, if she
ever was, typical of most American women. Women work, they write
checks, they pay the bills, and the determination of whether they
should be held responsible for their husbands' tax derelictions has
become more complex. The tendency of the courts, as in the Hayman
and Bokum cases, has been to decline to find "innocence" where the
wife is moderately well educated, professionally successful, or has even a
moderate familiarity with family finances and her husband's business.
But a substantial and legally very imprecise middle ground exists, where
a spouse seeking relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e) has greater education and
experience than the homemaker archetype of the Pietromonaco case, but
less than the successful career woman in Hayman. A more carefully
structured approach to defining the reasonableness of women's expecta-
tions with respect to the joint tax returns that they file with their
husbands might eliminate some of this imprecision.
This section of the Article reviews the statutory provisions
establishing joint and several liability and creating the innocent spouse
exception, together with the rather limited legislative and judicial
history that might aid in interpreting these statutes. The section then
examines in some detail the various elements of an innocent spouse
claim, in particular the question of whether a spouse seeking to be
relieved of liability had reason to know of her husband's
understatement of tax on the joint return.
A. The Overall Statutory Scheme
In general, husbands and wives who file joint federal income tax
returns are jointly and severally liable for any tax due, including interest
and penalties, even if all the tax liability is attributable to the economic
65. Judge Whalen advocated the latter procedure in Janet Bliss' case. Transcript of
record at 293, Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1993), af'd, 59 F.3d
374 (2d Cir. 1995).
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activity of only one spouse." Such joint and several liability has been
incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code since 1938.67 Although
earlier legislation had authorized the filing of joint returns,"8 their effect
remained unclear for some years. 69 As early as the 1920s, the IRS
insisted that the tax liability deriving from a joint return be joint and
several,70 but this theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in 1935 in Cole v. Commissioner.71 Shortly thereafter,
Congress reversed the effect of the Cole decision by enacting what is
66. I.RC § 6013(d)(3) (1994).
67. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Star. 447, 476.
68. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Star. 1057, 1074. In 1921, Congress made
it clear that the joint return should be used to calculate the overall tax due on the
basis of the aggregate income of the spouses, but did not explicitly establish joint
and several liability. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 223(b)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 250.
The joint return provided no special rate advantage until 1948, when Congress
enacted income-splitting provisions. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat.
110, 114. The current benefits of joint-return filings are reflected in I.R.C. § 1(a),
setting out the rate schedule applicable to the aggregate taxable income of a hus-
band and wife filing jointly. I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994).
69. Under the original provisions authorizing joint-return filing, the same rate schedule
applied to the aggregate income reported on a return, whether that income was for
one person or two. As a result, in most circumstances, the filing of a joint return
would tend to increase the total tax due by moving the taxpayers to a higher
marginal rate bracket. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family,
27 STAN. L REv. 1389, 1400 (1975). See alo Beck, supra note 7, at 336 (noting
that the aggregation of husband's and wife's income and deductions might either
increase or reduce the tax due).
70. I.T. 1575, 11-1 C.B. 144 (1923) (husband and wife are "individually liable for the
full amount of tax shown to be due on [a joint] return"). This position was adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. United States, 48 F.2d
201 (5th Cit. 1931) (implicitly adopting joint and several liability once it is deter-
mined that a joint return has been filed) and by the court of claims in Moore v.
United States, 37 F. Supp. 136, 140 (Ct. Cl. 1941). The Board of Tax Appeals,
predecessor of the Tax Court, also applied a joint and several liability rule in cases
where income could not be allocated between husband and wife. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 16, 26 (1938); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874
(1938). For discussion of the IRS's early theories of joint and several liability, see
Beck, supra note 7, at 335-40.
71. Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), revg 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933).
In Cole, the court rejected the Internal Revenue Service's contention that joint and
several liability was inescapably required by the "privilege" of joint filing. Cole, 81
F.2d at 487 (citing Fawsett v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 139, 141-42 (1934)). The
court also rejected the IRS argument that joint and several liability was required by
"administrative necessity." Cole, 81 F.2d at 488. Accord, Commissioner v. Rabenold,
108 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1940); Crowe v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796, 798 (7th
Cir. 1936).
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now Code I.R.C. § 6013(d), explicitly establishing joint and several
liability.72 It is not clear from the language of the 1938 amendment
whether the joint and several liability attached only to the tax reported
as due on the joint return or also to any additional tax that might
result from the omission of income or the claiming of improper deduc-
tions.
1. The Development of Joint and Several Liability
The rationale for joint and several liability involves two elements:
first, a quid pro quo for the "privilege" of filing a joint return,73 and,
second, the IRS' claim that any other approach to liability would create
excessive administrative difficulties.74 In the 1990s many women work
outside the home and the tax rates often impose a "marriage penalty"75
on two-earner couples. It is no longer clear, if it ever was, that the joint
return represents a "privilege." Nor is it clear how eliminating joint
returns or joint and several liability would substantially burden the IRS.
On the contrary, the burdens imposed by the courts on a woman
attempting to establish her status as an innocent spouse76 suggest that
the administrative difficulty, if any, falls heavily on the petitioner.
The desirability of using joint returns, and, hence, the exposure of
women to liability for their husbands' tax cheating, was significantly
increased by the introduction of income splitting in the Revenue Act of
72. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Star. 447, 476.
73. See, e.g., Sonnenbom v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 380-81 (1971) (joint and
several liability is exacted in exchange for the "highly valuable privilege" of filing a
joint return and, generally, obtaining the lower tax burden associated with such a
return). See also Pesch v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 100, 129-30 (1982) (setting out
the Tax Court's view of the history of joint and several liability).
74. As the court of appeals suggested in Cole, this burden could be reduced by the
simple expedient of requiring the spouse seeking to avoid liability to prove the
proper division of tax liability as between the spouses. Cole, 81 F.2d at 487-88.
Administrative convenience has been cited by Congress, however, as a reason for the
imposition of joint and several liability. See H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). Neither report
spells out the nature of this administrative necessity.
75. See Harvey S. Rosen, The Marriage Tax Is Down But Not Out, 40 NAT'L TAx J.
567 (1987) (estimating that, in 1988, some 40% of American married couples paid
an average of $1100 more than they would have if they had filed as single, unmar-
ried individuals, but that 53% of married couples-those in which one spouse did
not work outside the home or had minimal income-received an average marriage
subsidy of $600).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 100-121.
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1948.' In the then-typical one-wage-earner family,78 income splitting
resulted in substantially lower tax liability for the family's sole wage-
earner than if each spouse had filed separately.79 By 1990, roughly
ninety-nine percent of all married couples filed joint returns, with each
spouse thus incurring personal liability for the taxes due on the other's
77. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Star. 110, 114 (1948). Adoption of the
income-splitting joint return appears to have been, in part, a reaction to the spread
of community-property laws that followed the Supreme Court's decision in Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). The Supreme Court held that the division of
marital community income mandated by community-property statutes was effective
for federal income-tax purposes. Poe, 282 U.S. at 116. The Poe holding contrasts
with that of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), in which the Court declined to
give tax effect to a contractual arrangement entered into by husband and wife that
purported irrevocably to assign half the husband's income to the wife, even though
the contract was formed before there was any income tax to avoid.
In addition, the income-splitting provision of the 1948 Act was part of an
overall Republican strategy of tax reduction, included in a bill that also increased
personal exemptions and added an exemption for the blind and elderly. The chair
of the House Ways and Means Committee, Republican Harold Knutson, justified
the reductions as part of his party's effort to thwart "the short-haired women and
long-haired men of alien minds in the administrative branch of government [who]
were trying to wreck the American way of life and install a hybrid oligarchy at
Washington through confiscatory taxation," quoted in Carolyn C. Jones, Split
Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the r94os, 6 LAw & HiST.
REv. 259, 294 (1988).
78. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, more than two million American
women left the labor force. While women made up 35.4% of the civilian labor
force in 1944 (up from 27.6% in 1940), by 1947 that percentage had fallen back to
28.6%, essentially its prewar level. Jones, supra note 77, at 264. In addition to the
economic pressure on women's jobs fiom returning (mostly male) soldiers, there
was also a substantial cultural bias in favor of the mother-and-homemaker model of
women's lives. The first edition of Dr. Benjamin Spock's The Common Sense Book
of Baby and Child Care, advocating an approach to child-rearing that virtually
demanded a full-time mother, was published in 1945. BENJAMIN SpocK, M.D.,
THE COMMON SENSE BOOK OF BABY AND CHiLD CAnE (1945).
79. The marriage advantage was reduced, and for many two-earner families turned into
a marriage penalty, by the enactment in 1969 of a separate rate schedule for single
taxpayers, based on a Congressional policy determination that a single person
should pay more tax than a married couple with the same aggregate income, but
that this additional tax should not exceed 20% of the married couple's tax at any
given income level. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. VIII § 803,
83 Star. 487, 678. The separate rate schedule for single taxpayers is contained in
I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994). See generally Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation
of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HAmv. L. Rnv.
1573, 1584 (1977). For illustrations of the effect of the marriage penalty, see
McIntyre, supra at 1586-87; Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a
Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tax. L. Rav. 1, 22-23 (1980).
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income.8" In this context, and with no specific relief provisions incorpo-
rated in the Code to shield wives from their husbands' tax derelictions,
courts sometimes, though not always, relied on a variety of legal fictions
to avoid the draconian effect of joint and several liability in the most
egregious situations.8'
2. Statutory Relief Mechanisms
The legal fictions, however, were not always adequate to provide
relief even in the most dire cases, 2 and courts that were unable to
imagine a usable legal fiction to avoid imposing liability on a clearly
blameless wife were sometimes reduced to pleading with Congress to
change the rules.8 3 As a result, Congress in 1971 enacted a limited form
of relief8 4
80. Beck, supra note 7, at 319. The mere convenience of a joint return, however, and
not any particular economic advantage, may have been a factor in determining
which kind of return to file. As of 1938 (the last year before joint and several
liability became effective), 94% of married couples filed joint returns, even though
such returns produced a tax saving only in the case where one spouse's allowable
deductions exceeded his or her income. Beck, supra note 7, at 337 n.78 (citing
H.R REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1941), reprinted in 1941-2 C.B.
413, 426-27).
81. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957) (court found that
no joint return had been intended, even though the wife actually signed the return);
Brown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 116 (1968) (wife held to have signed the joint
return under duress, hence no true joint return); Hickey v. Commissioner, 14
T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1955) (same). But see Estate of Aylesworth v. Commissioner,
24 T.C. 134, 146 (1955) (wife held liable, even though husband procured her
signature by threatening to "destroy" her father and to mutilate her face).
82. See, e.g., Huelsman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1968), remanded,
416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969) (husband embezzled funds, which were not reported
on joint return, and from which wife received no benefit but wife still held liable
for the deficiency). But cf Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405
F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969) (husband embezzled
from wife's business, and Tax Court held her liable for the deficiency resulting from
failure to report the embezzled funds on the joint return; but the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit remanded, on the theory that the husband's conduct amounted
to the functional equivalent of fraud or duress).
83. See, e.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967) ("[A]lthough we have
much sympathy for the petitioner's unhappy situation and are appalled at the
harshness of this result ... the inflexible statute leaves no room for amelioration
.... [O]nly remedial legislation can soften the impact of strict individual liability.").
84. Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971). For a discussion of the background
to the 1971 legislation, see Bittan, supra note 29, at 129-30; Chance, supra note
29, at 303-04; Note, Innocent Spouses' Liability for Fraudulent Understatement of
Taxable Income on Joint Returns, 56 VA. L. REv. 1268 (1970).
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In its current form, as amended in 1984,5 the innocent spouse
statute provides for an exception to joint liability in the case of an
"innocent spouse," who may be relieved of liability in certain circum-
stances. Code Section 6013(e)(1) provides:
(1) In General.-Under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable
year,
(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax
attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse,
(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or
she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such
substantial understatement, and
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is ineq-
uitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for
such taxable year attributable to such substantial understatement,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the
extent such liability is attributable to such substantial understate-
ment.
I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1).86
A substantially similar statute, Section 66(c), provides relief in cases
where the spouses file separate returns, but, under community-property
laws, each spouse is considered to have earned half of the other's in-
come." In addition, I.R.C. § 6663(c) provides that the seventy-five
85. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, § 424, 98 Star. 494, 801
(1984). See infra text accompanying notes 94-99 for discussion of changes made by
the 1984 amendments.
86. Before 1984, § 6013(e) provided relief only if the understatement of tax was caused
by an omission of income. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 424 amended
§ 6 013(e) to include deficiencies attributable to any claim of deduction, credit or
basis for which there is no basis in fact or law. The 1984 amendments are retroac-
tively applicable to all open tax years to which the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
applies. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, § 424(a),(c), 98 Star.
494, 801-03 (1984).
87. The statute provides that:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(1)an individual does not file a joint return for any taxable year,
(2)such individual does not include in gross income for such taxable
year an item of community income properly includable therein which, in
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percent fraud penalty shall not apply to a spouse who signs a joint
return unless some part of the underpayment on the return is due to
fraud on the part of that spouse.
88
A "substantial understatement of tax" is any understatement that
exceeds $500.89 A "grossly erroneous item" is defined as any omission of
an amount that should be included in gross income, and any claim of a
deduction, credit or basis for which there is no foundation in fact or
law.90 In addition, in the case of erroneous deductions, credits, and so
forth, innocent spouse relief is available only if the understatement
exceeds specified percentages of the petitioner's adjusted gross income
accordance with the rule contained in section 879(a), would be treated as
income of the other spouse,
(3)the individual establishes that he or she did not know of, and had
no reason to know of, such an item of community, and
(4)taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to
indude such item of community income in such individual's gross in-
come, then,
for purposes of this tide, such item of community income shall be
included in the gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross
income of the individual).
I.R.C. § 66(c) (1994). Like the pre-198 4 version of section 6013(e), section 66(c)
does not address the case of deductions without a basis in fact or law that have the
effect of reducing stated tax liability. A companion statute, I.R.C. § 66(b) (1994),
permits the IRS to disregard the state-law effect of any community property law
and charge the income-earning spouse with the full amount of income earned if
such spouse acted as if he were solely entitled to the income and failed to notify the
other spouse of the nature and amount of such income before the due date for the
relevant tax return. I.R.C. § 66(b) (1994). Prior to the adoption of the § 66 rules,
courts uniformly declined to extend innocent spouse protection in the case of
separated, but not divorced, spouses in community property jurisdictions who filed
separate returns and omitted their theoretical share of community income earned by
the other spouse, but about which they had no knowledge. Chance, supra note 29,
at 307-08. The courts simply applied the requirement of § 6013(e)(1)(A) that a
joint return must be filed to qualify for relief, and did not inquire any further. See,
e.g., Coffiman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1975). For discussion of
I.R.C. § 66, see generally Nancie Quick & Joseph N. DuCanto, Joint Tax Liability
and the "Innocent Spouse" Doctrine in Common Law and Community Property Juris-
dictions: A Review of Code Section 6oi3(e) and Its Progeny, Section 66, 17 FAM. L.Q.
65, 77-86 (1983).
88. I.R.C. § 6663(c) (1994). In a community-property state, however, this protection
may be of limited value because the Internal Revenue Service can collect an assess-
ment against the fraudulent husband from the couple's community property, even if
the wife had no part in the fraud. See Kwong v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 959
(1976) (construing the predecessor of § 6663(c)).
89. I.RtC. § 6013(e)(3) (1994).
90. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) (1994).
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(including that of her spouse) for the year before the year in which the
IRS issues a deficiency notice.9 The percentage limitation does not
apply in the case of omissions of income on the original return.92
As originally enacted in 1971, the innocent spouse statute granted
relief where: (1) gross income attributable to the prospective non-inno-
cent spouse exceeded 25% of the gross income stated on the return; (2)
the income had been omitted from the return without the knowledge
of the innocent spouse; and (3) the omission occurred under circum-
stances in which the innocent spouse had not benefited from the omis-
sion and in which it would be inequitable to treat the innocent spouse
as liable for the omission.93 In 1984, Congress enacted three significant
changes to § 6013(e). 94 First, the 25% test for omission of gross in-
come was replaced by a "substantial understatement of tax" test,95 with
the result that relief was extended to situations in which a deficiency
arose from erroneous deductions, credits or basis, as well as omissions of
91. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) (1994). If the spouse's adjusted gross income for the pre-adjust-
ment year (i.e., the year before the deficiency notice is issued) is $20,000 or less
(induding any adjusted gross income of her then-spouse) then innocent spouse
relief is available only if the liability for tax (induding penalties and interest)
attributable to the grossly erroneous items of the non-innocent spouse for the year
at issue exceeds 10% of that adjusted gross income (AGI). If, however, the putative
innocent spouse's adjusted gross income for the pre-adjustment year exceeds
$20,000, then relief is available only if the liability exceeds 25% of that adjusted
gross income. For example, assume H and W filed a joint return for 1988 showing
adjusted gross income of $32,000. H and W divorced in 1989, when W's AGI was
$15,000. In 1990, W's AGI was $21,000. In January, 1991, the Internal Revenue
Service issued a deficiency notice with respect to the 1988 return, showing unpaid
tax of $3,000, interest of $900 and penalties of $750, for a total liability of $4,650.
The deficiency resulted from H's taking fraudulent business deductions.
The "pre-adjustment year" in this case is 1990, when W's AGI was $21,000.
Twenty-five percent of that amount is $5,250. Accordingly, innocent spouse relief
is not available, because the liability does not exceed this threshold. If, however the
deficiency notice had been issued in December, 1990, the pre-adjustment year
would have been 1989, when W's AGI was $15,000, and the 10% test would have
applied, thus making innocent spouse relief possible. See O'Connell, supra note 7,
at 226.
92. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(E) (1994).
93. Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971).
94. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, § 424, 98 Star. 494,
801-03 (1984); Susan M. Shepherd et al., Recent Changes Make More "Innocent
Spouses" Eligible frr Reliefflom Tax Deficiencies, 37 TAx'N FOR AccourmTs 46
(1986) (commenting on the 1984 amendments). The 1984 amendments applied
retroactively to all tax years that were still open as of the time of enactment. H..
RYP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1984).
95. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (1994).
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income. 6 Second, the lack of knowledge requirement was changed from
lack of knowledge of the omitted income to lack of knowledge of the
"substantial understatement,"97 i.e., any tax liability exceeding $500.9'
Third, the requirement that the innocent spouse not have benefited
from the omission was deleted, although the legislative history makes it
clear that Congress intended that a significant benefit to the person
claiming innocent spouse status was still a factor to be considered in
determining whether it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the
deficiency. 99
To succeed on an innocent spouse claim, the petitioner bears the
burden of proving that she is entitled to relief,1"' and must demonstrate
that she satisfies all four elements of the statute." 1 Usually, though not
always, there is little question as to whether the parties have filed a
joint return.0 2 Somewhat more frequently, there is a dispute as to
96. I.LC. §§ 6013(e)(1)(B)-(e)(2)(B) (1994).
97. I.RC. § 6013(e)(1)(0 (1994).
98. I.R.C. § 6013(c)(3) (1994).
99. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 1501-02 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 697, 1142-44. See Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.
672, 678 (1989) (citing this legislative history).
100. Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 E2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 381
(1971).
101. Price v. Commissioner, 887 E2d 959, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1989); Stevens v. Commis-
sioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1989); Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d
470, 473 (6th Cir. 1987); Ballard v. Commissioner, 740 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cit.
1984); Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1975); Adams, 60 T.C.
at 303; Sonnenborn, 57 T.C. at 381.
102. Prior to the adoption of the innocent-spouse statute, at least one court of appeals
had developed a theory that joint-return liability could be avoided if the wife knew
nothing of her husband's concealed income and did not profit from it, on the basis
that the joint nature of such a return was vitiated by the husband's fraud. See, e.g.,
Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cit. 1968), revk 48 T.C. 36 (1967).
In Scudder, the husband embezzled from his wife's business; the Tax Court then
held her liable for tax on the embezzled income, plus interest and a 50% fraud
penalty. The court of appeals held that the husband's conduct amounted to fraud or
duress, relieving the wife of joint-return liability. Scudder, 405 F.2d at 226. Accord,
Sharwell v. Commissioner, 419 F.2d 1057 (6th Cit. 1969); Huelsman v. Commis-
sioner, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
The issue of whether a joint return had actually been filed arose in only 12 of
the post-1971 innocent spouse cases. See, e.g., Berenbeim v. Commissioner, 63
T.C.M. (CCH) 2975 (1992); Nelson v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1448
(1987); Snyder v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 667 (1983); Williams v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 718 (1979).
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whether the tax deficiency results from "grossly erroneous" items, 13 or
whether the erroneous items are solely attributable to one spouse.1
0 4
In Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760 (1974), the Tax Court rejected an
equal-protection challenge to the joint return requirement, holding that the statute
did not unconstitutionally discriminate against taxpayers in community-property
states. Galliher, 62 T.C. at 763. Such taxpayers may now obtain relief, even if they
file separate returns. I.R.C. § 66 (1994).
103. The legislative history of the 1984 amendments to the statute provides the following
cryptic guidance: "Relief may be desirable, for example, where one spouse claims
phony business deductions..." H.R REP'. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.N. 697, 1143. A number of cases discuss whether
deductions disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service met the I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)
standard of having "no basis in fact or law." See, e.g., Douglas v. Commissioner, 86
T.C. 758 (1986), where the Tax Court defined the standard as follows:
[A] deduction has no.basis in fact when the expense for which the deduc-
tion is claimed was never, in fact, made. A deduction has no basis in law
when the expense, even if made, does not qualify as a deductible expense
under well-settled legal principles or when no substantial legal argument
can be made to support its deductibility. Ordinarily, a deduction having
no basis in fact or in law can be described as frivolous, fraudulent, or, to
use the word of the committee report, phony.
Doug/as, 86 T.C. at 762-63. See also Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136,
1142 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (deduction of partnership losses, although disallowed by the
IRS, not "grossly erroneous" because similar oil and gas investment deductions had
been allowed in other cases); LaMothe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1358,
1362 (1990) (tax shelter partnership deductions had a basis in fact or law even
though partially disallowed).
The mere fact that the IRS disallows deductions will not necessarily establish
that the deductions had no basis in fact or law. Dougas, 86 T.C. at 763. The
burden of proving such lack of factual or legal basis is on the petitioner, who must
present some evidence to that effect. Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 240
(1986), affd, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988). See
also Hawbaker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1742, 1745 (1988); Neary v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 4, 6 (1985).
The logical shortcomings of the "grossly erroneous" requirement are discussed at
length in Borison, supra note 29, at 841-60 and in Philipps & Braford, supra note
29, at 56-60. Professor Borison argues for adoption of a standard for declaring
deductions to be grossly erroneous that falls somewhere between mere disallowance
and the fraud or frivolous requirement most frequently articulated by the courts.
Borison, supra note 29, at 846-55.
104. See, e.g., Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 E2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1993) (investments
made in petitioner wife's name or as joint owner with husband; court rejected
arguments that she acted merely as a "front" for her husband and hence could be
regarded as an innocent spouse); Keene v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 553
(1979) (husband's claim that income earned by him but omitted from the return
prepared by his wife was not "attributable" to him summarily dismissed).
Income earned by taxpayers subject to state community property laws is, under
the statute, nonetheless "attributable" to the spouse who earns the income or who
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The requirement poses no problem with respect to omissions of in-
come; any omission of income that results in a tax liability exceeding
$500 is "grossly erroneous." 05 With respect to deductions, credits, and
claims of basis that are ultimately disallowed, however, the statute mere-
ly provides that a "grossly erroneous item" is "any claim of a deduction,
credit, or basis... for which there is no basis in fact or law."'0 6
This standard provides little in the way of guidance for the courts.
For example, in two cases, different outcomes followed from substan-
tially similar facts. In Shenker v. Commissioner,"0 7 the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit allowed innocent spouse relief where a worthless
stock actually lost its value in the year after the tax year in question,'
08
ignoring the issue of whether there was a "basis in fact or law" for
claiming the deduction in the earlier year. In contrast, in Purcell v.
Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, dealing with
the same issue, found that "there was both an arguable factual and legal
basis for claiming [the deductions] in the tax year in which they were
taken," 10 9 and hence denied innocent spouse relief.
Although the "grossly erroneous" definition affects fewer taxpayers
than the knowledge or reason-to-know standard, it could stand some
legislative clarification. The ability of a wife to prove that her husband's
deductions were "'fraudulent,' 'frivolous,' 'phony' or 'groundless""'
0
may be particularly limited where the husband has died or there has
been a divorce and the ex-wife has no practical way of obtaining what-
ever records the husband may have had. In addition, the case law
defining grossly erroneous deductions makes it clear that where the
husband had some arguable claim to make on behalf of the deduction,
(separately) owns the property from which the income is derived. I.RtC.
§ 6013(e)(5) (1994).
105. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (1994).
106. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1994).
107. Shenker v. Commissioner, 804 E2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2460 (1987).
108. Shenker, 804 E2d at 115.
109. Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 E2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
987 (1988).
110. Feldman v. Commissioner, 20 E3d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bokum
v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)). See
also Flynn v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 355, 364 (1989) ("deduction has no basis in
law when the expense, even if made, does not qualify as a deductible expense under
well-settled legal principles or when no substantial legal argument can be made to
support its deductibility").
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but where it was ultimately disallowed, then relief is unavailable. "'
Presumably the theory is that even if the husband had fully explained
the claimed deduction to the wife, and if she had hired her own experts
to examine the return, she still would have signed it."2 Whether such a
strict interpretation fits well with the supposedly remedial purposes of
the statute as a whole is at least open to question.
By far the greatest number of cases turn on whether, as in Janet
Bliss's case, the spouse or ex-spouse claiming relief under I.R.C.
§ 6013(e) knew or had reason to know of the deficiency.13 Generally,
the Tax Court decisions show a willingness to accept at face value a
petitioner's testimony as to actual knowledge of an understatement," 4
because a judge inclined to deny innocent spouse relief can find that
there was reason to know without impugning the credibility of the
petitioner." 5
The cases sometimes, but not often, deny innocent spouse relief
solely on the basis that it would not be inequitable to hold the petitioner
111. See, e.g., Bokum v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183, 1196 (1990) (IRS
concession to allow some but not all of a claimed deduction means that the portion
not allowed is not grossly erroneous).
112. Cf. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 141-44 (1990), af'd, 992 E2d 1136
(11th Cir. 1993) (mischaracterization of ordinary income as capital gain is not
grossly erroneous).
113. Fifty-five percent of reported post-1971 innocent spouse cases found that the peti-
tioning spouse had "reason to know." In addition, 107 of the 435 cases, or 24.6%,
found that the petitioning spouse had actual knowledge of the understatement.
Because some cases do not determine whether the spouse had actual or constructive
knowledge, but merely state that she had one or the other, the total number of
cases involving the knowledge issue is less than the sum of the two items. See data
on file with author, described supra note 8.
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 508, 512-13 (1975)
(wife's testimony as to lack of actual knowledge of husband's embezzlement accept-
ed, even though I.R.S. agent testified that the wife had told the agent that she knew
of the embezzlement income); Cecere v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593,
1599-1600 (1975), affd, 547 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1976) (wife liable for tax on
husband's income from loan sharking, even though she was found to have no
reason to know of the omitted income, because she benefitted from the joint
ownership of real property purchased with the omitted income and hence failed to
qualify as an innocent spouse).
115. Butsee Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1993) (Judge Whalen found
petitioner's testimony that she did not know every detail of her about-to-be-ex-
husband's finances to be unbelievable). For a discussion of women's approach to
divorce negotiations, see infia text accompanying notes 300-324. The reason-to-
know standard is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 127-177.
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liable." 6 More frequently, where relief is denied, the denial will be based
either on the petitioner's supposed or constructive knowledge or on a
combination of the knowledge and equity grounds." 7 In those cases that
do turn on the equity issue, the opinions generally focus on whether the
petitioning spouse received a significant benefit from the omitted in-
come or the understatement of tax. The analysis of what constitutes a
benefit, however, is not always consistent. For example, in Adams v.
Commissioner,"' the petitioner (the husband in this case) received
$297,000 as part of a divorce settlement in a year after the year at issue
in the tax proceeding. The court held that the transfer constituted
significant benefit in view of the husband's net worth of $33,000
116. That it would not be inequitable to hold the petitioner liable was the sole reason for
denying relief in 49 of the 435 cases (11.3%). See data on file with author, described
supra note 8. See, e.g., Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 681 (1989)
(even though petitioner was very wealthy and could have supported a lavish lifestyle
without resort to the understatements of tax attributable to her husband, that fact
alone is insufficient to satisfy her burden of proof to show that she did not benefit
from the understatements); LaMothe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1358
(1990) (denying relief both on the ground that the deductions at issue had a basis
in fact or law, although they were disallowed, and that it would not be inequitable
to hold the petitioner, who had inherited over $650,000 from her husband, liable for
a tax deficiency of approximately $18,000 attributable to the husband's deductions).
The test of whether it would be "inequitable" to hold the petitioning spouse liable
has generally been phrased by the courts as whether she received substantial benefits
from the understatement of tax. Purificaro v. Commissioner, 9 F.3d 290 (3d Cit.
1993) (relief denied solely on "inequitable" grounds, and despite petitioners' frugal
lifestyles, because measurable assets had been accumulated as a result of the under-
statements of tax); Hammond v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, 1200
(1990); Hinds v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 104, 106 (1988); Purcell v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 241 (1986), affd, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988). Normal spousal support is generally not considered a
"benefit" for purposes of this test. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (1974); Flynn v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 355, 367 (1989). However, unusual or lavish support will
be considered a benefit. Estate of Krock, 93 T.C. at 679.
The Internal Revenue Manual makes it dear that if substantially all of one
spouse's omitted income is used for gambling, supporting extramarital affairs,
benefitting third parties, purchasing of assets not in joint ownership and not used for
joint benefit, supporting a living style not enjoyed by the non-culpable spouse, or
maintaining separate bank accounts or other caches of funds unavailable to the other
spouse, then no benefit is to be imputed to that spouse. INrTEm~. REVENUE MARuAL
§ 45(11)(20).
117. See, e.g., Adcock v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1103, 1108 (1993) (wife was
aware of husband's guilty plea to extortion charge and failed to show that she had
not benefitted from the extortion income).
118. Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
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immediately before the couple's separation." 9 In contrast, the transfer
of $155,000 to the petitioner in Terzian v. Commissioner20 following
divorce was held not to constitute a significant benefit. In the court's
view, the amount was in lieu of alimony payments and hence was
"ordinary support." 121
3. The Relevance of Divorce
The legislative history of the innocent spouse provision specifically
directs attention to the situation of women who have been abandoned,
separated, or divorced after the tax year at issue, suggesting that a
divorcing woman should not be held liable for her husband's tax defi-
ciencies, especially when the ex-husband has disappeared, leaving the
former spouse to "'face the music' alone." 122 The Senate Finance Com-
mittee's report on the 1971 enactment of the innocent spouse provision
stated that the purpose of the legislation was to correct the obviously
unfair prior case law that held innocent wives liable for the tax conse-
quences of their husbands' misdeeds,' 23 particularly in cases where the
Service assesses a deficiency after the putatively innocent spouse has
been abandoned or divorced by the husband who was responsible for
the understatement of tax on the joint return. The legislation was also
designed "to bring government tax collection practices into accord with
basic principles of equity and fairness." 24 The courts have generally
regarded the fact of divorce as a factor to be taken into account as part
of the determination as to whether it would be inequitable to hold the
petitioning spouse liable for the deficiency.2 5 As Janet Bliss's case
119. Adams, 60 T.C. at 304.
120. Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979).
121. Terzian, 72 T.C. at 1172. The Terzian court drew on the legislative history to find
that reasonable alimony or its equivalent would not be considered a significant
benefit. Terzian, 72 T.C. at 1172. SeeS. REp. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3
(1970).
122. Cf Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
a well-informed separated but not divorced wife was liable for tax deficiencies). See
Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 381 (1971); S. REP. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3-4 (1970).
123. S. REp. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1970). See, e.g., Huelsman v. Com-
missioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1968), remanded, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.
1969).
124. S. REp. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1970).
125. See, e.g., Purificato v. Commissioner, 9 E3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If the
spouse did not specifically benefit, was subsequently deserted, divorced, or
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indicates, however, divorce is a factor that the court can use to support
either the granting or denial of innocent-spouse relief.
126
B. The Reason-to-Know Standard
Joint tax liability is one of the few areas in Anglo-American law to
depart from the general rule that people are not held liable for the mis-
deeds of others. Congress therefore must have intended the innocent
spouse statute to be construed liberally in order to avoid, whenever
possible, the unfairness of charging unknowing spouses with errors for
which they had no responsibility.' 27 Even before adopting the innocent-
spouse statute, Congress had, in private laws, recognized that injustice
could occur under the joint-liability principle, and had relieved individ-
uals of such liability. 2 '
To a certain extent, case law under the innocent spouse provision
appears to recognize the liberal, remedial purposes of the statute. Courts
have recognized, for example, that the implicit purpose of the statute "is
to protect one spouse from the over-reaching or dishonesty of the
other."'129 And numerous decisions refer to the statute's broad function
of remedying injustice, with the implication that the statute should not
be interpreted in an overly rigid manner.
130
separated, and would have to pay the tax and additions from his or her own assets,
equity may weigh in favor of relief.").
126. Bliss appears to be one of only two of the 435 cases examined that raise the issue of
whether the process of divorce itself, with its attendant involvement of lawyers and
accountants, is relevant to the spouse's reason to know of an understatement of tax.
The other such case is Levin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 6, 7 (1987), also
denying relief where a joint return for 1977 was signed by the petitioner in May,
1978, two weeks after her divorce became final. The rationale of these cases,
however, has also been applied in cases of marital discord that had not yet reached
the divorce courts. For example, in Young v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH)
1156, 1160 (1981), the court suggested that the emotional strain on the petitioning
wife because of marital problems might have caused her "to scrutinize more carefil-
ly her husband's actions than she ordinarily might have."
127. S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
128. See, e.g., Priv. L. No. 90-362, 82 Star. 1438 (1968) (relieving wife of tax liability
with respect to husband's embezzlement income). See also Priv. L. No. 95-27, 91
Star. 1661 (1977) (permitting taxpayer to apply the rules of I.R.C. § 6013(e)
retroactively to a tax year prior to the enactment of the statute).
129. Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
987 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Price v. Commissioner, 887 E2d 959, 963-64 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989);
Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975); Allen v.
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When, however, it comes to determining whether a woman had
reason to know of her husband's understatement of tax, these broad
liberal sentiments disappear more frequently than not. Although the
courts early on rejected the IRS's proposed standard-that an innocent-
spouse petitioner prove she was completely without fault and could not
possibly have discovered the omission of income before signing the
return131-the standard that they have substituted in its place is not
appreciably more forgiving, at least to those taxpayers who are not full-
time lawyers, accountants, or business people.
The generally stated rule with regard to the reason-to-know test is
whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer, under the circumstances at the
time of signing the return, would have had reason to know that the tax
liability stated on the return was erroneous or that further investigation
was warranted. 132 Thus, in theory at least, the spouse seeking relief need
not prove that she was entirely without fault nor that she could not
possibly have discovered omissions of gross income before signing the
joint return; such a test would be too stringent and inconsistent with
the purposes of the statute.'33 But theory and reality too often part
company when this rule is actually applied.
The courts generally apply two different reason-to-know tests, one
for omissions of income and another for disallowed deductions. In the
omission-of-income cases, the usual test is whether the taxpayer knew
or should have known of the transaction that produced the income
which the other spouse failed to report on the joint return. 4 In these
cases, "[m]ere knowledge of the underlying transaction that produced
the omitted income is sufficient to deny innocent spouse relief."135 In
Commissioner, 514 E2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1975); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner,
57 T.C. 373, 381 (1971).
131. Sanders, 509 E2d at 166. There is at least some support in the legislative history
for a strict rule with respect to knowledge of the understatement. Representative
Byrnes, one of the floor managers of the 1971 legislation, stated that relief required
"complete ignorance of the omission [of income]." 116 CONG. REc. 43,351 (1971).
132. Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 E2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989). A similar test,
also cited frequently, is whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer, with the particular
petitioner's knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, and bearing in mind her
level of intelligence, experience, and education, would have had no reason to know
of the understatement. Sanders, 509 F.2d at 167.
133. Sanders, 509 E2d at 166.
134. Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 E2d 1256, 1261 (2d Cir. 1993); Erdahl v. Com-
missioner, 930 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1991).
135. Eriah 930 E2d at 589; Price v. Commissioner, 887 E2d 959, 963 n.9 (9th Cir.
1989). In cases involving the community-property analog to § 6013(e), I.R.C.
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deduction cases, however, knowledge of the underlying transaction is
almost always present, because the tax return itself lists the deduction
on its face, and application of the "mere knowledge" test would virtual-
ly wipe out innocent spouse protection.' Accordingly, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have adopted a more lenient test for deduction cases: the taxpayer must
establish that "she did not know and did not have reason to know that
the deduction would give rise to a substantial understatement."' 37
In both erroneous deduction and omission-of-income cases, the
courts have generally cited four factors that are said to be relevant in
analyzing whether a spouse had reason to know of a substantial under-
statement of tax on a joint return:
(1) the spouse's level of education and sophistication;
(2) the spouse's degree of involvement in the family finances
and business affairs;
(3) the presence of expenditures (known to the petitioning
spouse) that appear lavish or unusual when compared to
the family's past levels of income, standard of living and
spending patterns; and
§ 66(c), the standard has been even more rigorous. The Tax Court has consistently
held that a spouse's unawareness of the amount of community income is not
sufficient to justify relief under § 66(c) as long as the spouse had some knowledge
of the mere existence of an income-producing activity. See, e.g., McGee v. Commis-
sioner, 979 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir. 1992) (petitioner knew of husband's dental
practice, but not the amount of income); Abrams v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1433, 1435 (1989) (petitioner knew her husband was a lawyer, but not the
extent of his income); Thatcher v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 707, 710
(1988) (petitioner knew of the existence of husband's business); Roberts v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 94, 97 (1987), af'd, 860 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (5th
Cir. 1988) (petitioner knew her husband was involved in real estate transactions,
but knew no details of those transactions); Baldwin v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M.
(CCH) 22, 24 (1986) (petitioner knew her husband was a university teacher and
earned a salary, although she did not know the amount). In these cases, the courts
have imposed a duty of inquiry on the non-income-earning spouse. In McGee, for
example, the court said that the wife should have asked the accountant who pre-
pared the tax return for the information that would have enabled her to determine
whether the husband's income, as stated on the return, was correct. McGee, 979
F.2d at 70.
136. _rice, 887 E2d at 963 n.9; accord, Guth v. Commissioner, 897 E2d 441, 444 (9th
Cir. 1990).
137. Price, 887 E2d at 963; accord, Erdahl 930 E2d at 589; Hayman, 992 E2d at
1261. a
1996]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
(4) the culpable spouse's evasiveness and deceit concerning
the family's finances. 3
The rule is generally phrased in gender-neutral terms, although recogni-
tion of the petitioner's knowledge of all the relevant circumstances must
inevitably include recognition of gender differences. 39
At least one commentator has noted that, despite the frequent
listing of these reason-to-know criteria in the cases, the result in any
particular case is still difficult to predict."'0 There is no formula for
weighting the various factors, and in practice, the individual Tax Court
judges seem often to rely on their own evaluation of the credibility of
the innocent-spouse petitioner.141
Nonetheless, examining the court-imposed standards, some clear
patterns emerge. First, with regard to the spouse's educational back-
ground and sophistication, the ideal petitioner is apparently someone
like Emilia Pietromonaco, who has at most a high school education and
minimal familiarity with business matters. Once a wife has more than a
high school education, the balance apparently begins to tilt against her.
A high school graduate married to a man with a professional degree
may sometimes qualify for relief,14 2 while more educated women will
face a stricter standard.'43 Janet Bliss, for example, was held to a higher
standard, even though she did not begin her college and law school
career until several years after she had signed the fateful tax return. The
courts' reliance on a woman's educational level as a measure of whether
she can be expected to spot tax cheating ignores the realities of wom-
en's role in family finances. 1 4
138. Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 E2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989).
139. For a discussion of the reasonable woman standard, see infra text accompanying
notes 294-299.
140. Borison, supra note 29, at 832.
141. Borison, supra note 29, at 832. See, e.g., Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH)
374 (1993) (Tax Court judge determines, without explanation, that wife's testimony
was not sufficiently credible to qualify her for innocent spouse relie).
142. See, e.g., DeMartino v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1278 (1986) (wife was
high school graduate, husband was furres trader); Zinser v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1109 (1978) (wife was high school graduate, husband had M.D.
degree).
143. See, e.g., Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 E2d 1256, 1258 (2d Cir. 1993) (petition-
er was vice president of large retail clothing company, with responsibility for
million-dollar budget; no relief granted).
144. See Pm'LUs CHESLER & EMILY JANE GOODMAN, WOMEN, MONEY & POWER 132
(1975) (contrasting the role expectations of a "dutiful" wife with the ability to take
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A corollary of the background and sophistication criterion is the
wife's emotional state. Tax Court judges, perhaps afraid of unleashing a
torrent of expert psychological testimony similar to that frequently
offered in sexual harassment and battered women's criminal defense
cases, rarely make this factor explicit in their opinions. In one of the
cases that does raise the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the wife's severe emotional problems and alcoholism
were relevant to the inquiry as to whether she had reason to know of
an understatement of tax, and that consideration of such factors was
consistent with a liberal, remedial reading of the innocent spouse stat-
ute. 145 By extension, this kind of analysis could also be applied where
the tax return in question has been prepared during the course of a
divorce proceeding, in which case the wife's approach to handling
divorce matters would be a relevant factor in assessing her reason to
know of any understatement on the return.
Similarly, too great an association with the dominant middle-class
culture weighs against the petitioner. Relief has frequently been granted
to immigrant wives who speak little or no English and whose lawyers
can cite alien cultural patterns as the reason that the wives left virtually
all financial management to men. 46 The fact that many American
middle- and working-class households operate in much the same way
seems largely to have escaped the judges' attention. This cultural factor
overlaps with the second factor generally cited by the courts-the
degree of involvement of the innocent spouse petitioner in family
finances and business affairs. Where a spouse was routinely involved in
day-to-day business matters that led to the tax understatement, 147 or was
physically present during the specific transactions that gave rise to the
an active role in family financial decisions).
145. Sanders v. United States, 509 E2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1975).
146. See, e.g., Aina v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 88 (1987) (petitioner and her
husband were born in Nigeria; her husband controlled the family finances; inno-
cent-spouse relief granted even though petitioner had a college degree and was a
registered nurse); Ratana v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1980), rev'd
in part and affd in part, 662 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1981) (petitioner was Filipina,
husband was Thai).
147. See, e.g., Most v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1972) (wife worked in
husband's insurance office and therefore, in the court's view, might well have
known of husband's misappropriation of insurance proceeds that were due to policy
holders).
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understatement,"' courts routinely find that the spouse either knew or
had reason to know of the understatement.149
The cases are contradictory in their assumptions as to the extent to
which a wife who is nominally an officer of her husband's business, but
who has little or no real involvement with it, should be held to have
knowledge of the business income. For example, in Sonnenborn v.
Commissioner,"0 one of the first Tax Court cases interpreting the inno-
cent spouse statute, the Tax Court attached considerable significance to
the petitioner's title as treasurer of her husband's business, holding that
she had failed to meet her burden of proving that she had no access to
the business records. 51 But in Carter v. Commissioner,152 where the
petitioner was the corporate secretary of her husband's business, the
court assumed that, given the nature of her "symbolic" position, she
had no access to the company's financial records.153
The occasional leniency of the courts with respect to symbolic
participation in a husband's business does not extend, however, to
participation in family finances. Where a wife is regularly part of the
family's budgeting and financial decision-making, she will almost always
be held to have reason to know of a tax understatement.154 The ideal
version of innocence with respect to this criterion is embodied by
Emilia Pietromonaco, who received an allowance from her husband and
148. See, e.g., Heywood v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1974) (wife was
present when husband cashed money orders that represented the fruits of his
embezzlement).
149. See, e.g., Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 E2d 1256, 1258 (2d Cir. 1993) (Petition-
er signed checks for tax shelter investments, but was advised by husband that the
investments were "legal." Petitioner was also generally responsible for paying house-
hold bills, although the couple's tax returns were prepared by an accountant.).
150. Sonnenbom v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
151. Sonnenborn, 57 T.C. at 382.
152. Carter v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1977).
153. Carter, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1296.
154. See, e.g., Young v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1156, 1159 (1981) (wife had
bachelor's and master's degree and handled all the family bill-paying); Estate of
Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356, 359-60 (1979) (even though wife had only
a sixth-grade education and no actual knowledge of her husband's narcotics dealing,
court held that she had reason to know of omitted income because of the large
discrepancy between the amount of money required to maintain the family's
lifestyle and the amount actually reported on the return); Nicholas v. Commission-
er, 70 T.C. 1057, 1067 (1978) (wife kept the family checkbook and paid most of
the bills).
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never asked any questions.' On occasion, however, a wife who has
some involvement in family finances may be found to lack a reason to
know of an understatement if the husband's finances are particularly
complex. 16
As to the third factor, what constitutes lavish and extravagant
expenditures in an innocent spouse case is a matter of perspective. 157 If
family spending is reasonably consistent with the amount of income
that was actually reported on the couple's tax return, or when spending
in excess of income could reasonably have been financed by savings,
gifts, or borrowing, then courts will often find that a spouse did not
necessarily have reason to know of an understatement. 15 In contrast,
where the observable family spending far exceeds the reported income,
the wife will generally be held responsible for knowledge of that in-
come.159 Similarly, where the unreported income is used for the "ordi-
nary support of the innocent spouse," that use will not bar relief under
§ 6013(e)160
This criterion includes an adjustment for the petitioner's "station
in life,"' 6' with the result that the same expenditures will be held to be
155. Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 E3d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1993). The role of a
dutiful wife in this cultural setting is apparently to ask no questions and to accept
whatever the husband chooses to provide as "table money." See JIMmy BREsLiN,
TABLE MONEY passim (1986).
156. See, e.g., Hayes v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976, 981 (1975) (wife with a
10th-grade education plus some bookkeeping experience and control of the family
checking account held not to have had reason to know of her frequently absent
husband's omission of income on the joint return).
157. For example, the Code permits a deduction for "traveling expenses (induding
amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish and
extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a
trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1994). The Code, however, provides no
definition of "lavish and extravagant."
158. See Pietromonaco, 3 E3d 1342 (wife could have believed that the difference between
reported income and household expenditures came from savings or from borrow-
ing); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698-99 (1972) (wife reasonably
believed that the family's expenses were paid either from reported income or from
bank balances available at the beginning of the year).
159. See Estate of Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356, 361 (1979) (reported income
of $10,000, but spending that reflected an income of $86,000).
160. Mysse, 57 T.C. at 698.
161. The determination of reasonableness by reference to a litigant's "station in life" or
standard of living is not limited to tax law. The concept is familiar in trust litiga-
tion, where distributions for support of a trust beneficiary are often related to the
standard to which the beneficiary is accustomed. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Rockefeller, 260 N.Y.S.2d 111, 115 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1965) (in exercising discretion,
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lavish and extravagant if incurred by a working-class family of modest
means, but held to be ordinary support if incurred by a family that is
already well-off. For the high-income family, the purchase of a new
home or car, gambling trips to Las Vegas, or the purchase of a vacation
condominium in the Bahamas may be so ordinary as not to create any
reason to know,162 while the same expenses incurred by a poorer family
would be deemed to be lavish, creating a reason to know.
16 3
The fourth factor, the level of the other spouse's evasiveness and
deceit, is more problematic. On the one hand, some courts have held
that such deceitful behavior by one spouse creates a further duty of
inquiry on the part of the other spouse, resulting in her having reason
to know, even if he will not tell her.' On the other hand, there are
some courts that decline to find a reason to know where there is a
persistent, long-standing pattern of withholding information from the
other spouse.165 The legislative history is enigmatic regarding the effect
trustees can be expected to consider the beneficiary's "station in society" as well as
beneficiary's requirements in her present circumstances).
162. Sanders v. United States, 509 E2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1975).
163. Compare Estate ofjackson, 72 T.C. at 357-58 (couple, prior to the year in which
income was omitted from the return, paid a monthly rent of $95, while in the
following year, they purchased a three-story home for $36,500, as well as new
furniture, two Cadillacs and two trucks for the husband's business) with Enterline v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 454, 460 (1980) (the purchase of a new Cadillac
and department store charges of more than $10,000 for furniture and clothes held
not to be lavish or extravagant in the context of total family expenditures of
$63,478).
164. See, e.g., Carsendino v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2248, 2253 (1994)
("[husband's] absolute withholding of the details of the tax returns would indicate
that petitioner should have been on notice that the returns she signed may have
been incomplete"); Alberts v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 665, 667 (1986)
(husband refused to answer wife's questions about business and finance); Dickey v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1041, 1047 (1985) (petitioner should have been
on notice because of his knowledge of his wife's earlier embezzlement); Adams v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 302 (1973) (wife repeatedly refused to furnish peti-
tioner husband copies of tax returns).
165. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 743, 745 (1987); Walker v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 105, 110 (1985); Cox v. Commissioner, 45
T.C.M. (CCH) 333, 339 (1982); Ratner v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 251,
253 (1981); Feingold v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 309, 311 (1980);
Bonhag v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 250, 251 (1980) (all granting relief
despite, or even because of, the culpable spouse's pattern of secrecy). See alo De-
Martino v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1278, 1293 (1986) (no duty of
further inquiry because wife would not have understood husband's straddle transac-
tions even if they had been explained).
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of a culpable spouse's pattern of evasiveness and deceit.1"6 The only
plausible interpretation of charging a wife with a higher duty of inquiry
where the husband is evasive or deceitful is that Congress intended to
turn marital partners into part-time IRS agents, responsible for investi-
gating their partners' tax affairs in great detail. Such a policy is difficult
to ascribe to Congress without more of a basis than the legislative
history provides.
Even in the case of one of the more obvious forms of evasiveness
and deceit-embezzlement or other illegal activity by the culpable spouse
that results in arrest and therefore is likely to bring the law-breaking to
the other spouse's attention-the cases are inconclusive and contradicto-
ry. In Enterline v. Commissioner, the petitioner was held not to have
reason to know of her husband's understatement of tax on a return that
she signed before he had filled it out even though she knew that he had
admitted embezzling money from his employer and that a complaint had
been filed against him.167 By contrast, in Leon v. Commissioner, a wife
who knew of her husband's arrest for operating a brothel was held to
have reason to know of his income from that activity. 168
Ignorance of the law, as in most areas of tax law,' 69 is no excuse
for a would-be innocent spouse.17° As one judge commented, section
166. Neither the committee report on the original 1971 legislation nor that on the 1984
amendments have any reference to the duty of inquiry on the part of a wife whose
husband appears to be deceitful or evasive. See S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1971); H.R REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1119 (1984).
167. Enterline v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 454, 459-60 (1980).
168. In Leon, the wife was held to have reason to know of the unreported income as of
the date of her husband's arrest; this finding resulted in innocent spouse relief for the
year preceding the year of his arrest and a denial of relief for the year of his arrest.
Leon v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060, 1064-65 (1981).
169. There is, however, a state of mind element required for a determination of either
civil or criminal tax fraud. Gano v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 518, 533 (1930).
170. See, e.g., Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989);
Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1989); Ratana v. Commission-
er, 662 F.2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1981). But cf Altman v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d
876, 880 (2d Cit. 1973) (suggesting that knowledge of receipt of funds, combined
with a good-faith belief that the funds were a gift, and hence excludible from gross
income under I.R.C. § 102, would not constitute actual knowledge or reason to
know of an understatement). In Altman, the court found that the petitioner did not
have a good-faith belief that the funds in question were a gifr. Altman, 475 F.2d at
1880. In Ratana, the court rejected the argument, apparently accepted in Altman,
that "while relief from joint liability cannot be predicated on ignorance regarding
the taxability of known amounts of gross income, it can be predicated on ignorance
regarding whether certain income is viewed as 'gross income' for tax purposes."
Ratana, 662 F.2d at 224.
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6013(e) was not "designed to abate joint and several liability where the
lack of knowledge of the omitted income is predicated on mere igno-
rance of the legal tax consequences of transactions the facts of which are
either in the possession of the spouse seeking relief or reasonably within
his reach."17' Nor is an understatement of tax that results from a mis-
take by a tax return preparer or from the shared error of both husband
and wife as to the tax consequences of a transaction sufficient to sup-
port innocent spouse relief, in such cases, courts have held that both
spouses are equally "innocent," and thus there is no inequity in holding
them both liable for the deficiency.17 2 On the other hand, where a
spouse's deceitful practices are consistent over a long period of time and
have not given the other spouse prior reason to be suspicious, some
courts will hold that there was no reason for the other spouse to know
of the understatement. 173 Events such as tax audits or criminal investiga-
tions constitute reason for suspicion. 74
Disagreement among the courts of appeals is particularly acute in
cases of understatements engendered by fraudulent or unsubstantiated
deductions. For example, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have held that knowledge of the underlying transaction
171. McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972). See also Price v. Commission-
er, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414 (1987) (denying innocent spouse relief where wife
knew of husband's embezzlement income and its omission from return, but believed
embezzlement income was not taxable); Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162,
166 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975); Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir.
1975); Newton v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1990); Mayworm v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 941 (1987).
172. McCoy, 57 T.C. at 735. See also, Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 E2d 1256, 1262
(2d Cir. 1993) (relief also denied on other grounds); Bokum v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 126 (1990), affd, 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993) (neither husband nor wife
was aware of the tax consequences of receiving real estate sales proceeds as corporate
dividends, hence no inequity in holding both liable for the deficiency).
173. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 743 (1987) (wife held to have
had no reason to know of truck driver husband's omission of reimbursement in-
come, even though she cashed the reimbursement checks, apparently because of her
obvious inability, in the court's view, to manage the family finances); Walker v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 105 (1985) (wife embezzled large amounts from
her employer and her less well educated husband was granted innocent spouse relief,
in part because his wife lied to him whenever he asked about the family budget);
Ratner v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 251 (1981) (wife held to have had no
knowledge of the scope of income from husband's adult publishing business because
husband controlled financial information and led wife to believe that some of his
available funds represented gifts from family members).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Buahlow, 832 E Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (wife
present when criminal investigators interviewed husband and innocent spouse status
denied).
[Vol. 3:421
INNOCENT SPOUSES AND THE IRS
is tantamount to knowledge of the tax understatement, 175 while the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted a somewhat more
flexible test:
[I]f a spouse knows virtually all of the facts pertaining to the
transaction which underlies the substantial understatement,
her defense in essence is premised solely on ignorance of law.
In such a scenario, ... she is considered as a matter of law to
have reason to know of the substantial understatement .... 176
Whichever test is applied, the broadly remedial aims of the inno-
cent spouse statute are being swallowed up by the elaboration of de-
tailed nonstatutory tests that make establishing one's entitlement to
relief ever more difficult. For example, in an omission-of-income case,
with respect to the "know or reason to know" test of I.R.C.
§ 6 013(e)(1)(C), the petitioner must not only show that she did not
actually know of the understatement and that she did not know of the
underlying transaction, but she must also show that, faced with some
evidence of fraud on the face of the return, she exercised her duty of
inquiry-even if, had she in fact inquired, she would have received a
satisfactory explanation that would not have given her reason to know
of the understatement. 177 What is expected of the "reasonably prudent
taxpayer" is based on a hyper-rational model of the educated, middle-
or upper-class, male taxpayer, who carefully reviews each line of his tax
return and asks penetrating questions of the accountant who prepared
the return whenever he has the slightest doubt about an item. Whether
175. Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 E2d 1499, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1989); Purcell v.
Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987
(1988).
176. Price v. Commissioner, 887 E2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
Similar standards have been adopted by the Second and Eighth Circuits. Hayman,
992 F.2d at 1261-62; Erdahl v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1991). The
Tax Court, however, has refused to adopt this more lenient rule, except in cases
that are appealable to the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. Bokum, 94 T.C. at 126. Under the rule in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 742 (1970), a~fd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court considers
itself bound by a court of appeals decision only in cases that are appealable to that
same court of appeals.
177. See, e.g., Kappenberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3132 (1994) ("spouse is
not entitled to 'innocent spouse' relief unless she can show that she inquired about
and laid to rest any doubts that a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her position
would have had about the accuracy of the joint returns" (citing Langberg v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2981 (1994))).
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the model applies to any but a small minority of taxpayers of either
gender is questionable; that it applies to very many women whose
husbands prepare their joint returns is even more implausible.
II. THE REASONABLE WOMAN
Would it make a difference to the outcome of the innocent spouse
cases if the "reasonably prudent taxpayer" were replaced by the "reason-
ably prudent woman taxpayer"? Are there sub-categories of the "reason-
able person" or the "reasonably prudent taxpayer" that could be used in
the innocent spouse context to produce results that are consistent with
the economic and psychological reality underlying the cases? Such
gender-specific changes have begun to emerge in other areas of law in
the past decade, and one might at least question whether some of the
intuitively unreasonable outcomes in the innocent spouse cases dis-
cussed above might have been avoided had the standard been the
reasonable woman-or one of a number of sub-categories of reasonable
women-rather than the "reasonably prudent taxpayer."178
The following sections of this Article describe the evolution of the
reasonable man standard and some recent developments in the elabora-
tion of the reasonable woman as a standard of behavior in a variety of
non-tax legal arenas.
In addition to its role in tax law, the "reasonable man" standard
(or, in a largely cosmetic revision, the "reasonable person" standard) is
a fixture in such disparate areas of law as administrative law, 17' bail-
ments, i'8 constitutional law,1'8 contracts,"8 2 and the law of trusts.'83 In
178. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 E2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting
reason-to-know test of a "reasonable person in the taxpayer's subjective position"
and rejecting the IRS argument for a reason-to-know test that would require the
innocent spouse petitioner to demonstrate that she was "completely without fault
and could not possibly have discovered the omission before executing the returns");
Stevens, 872 F.2d at 1505.
179. See 2 AM. JuR. 2D Administrative Law § 656 (1994).
180. CHESTER H. SMrrH & RALPH E. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAw Or PROPERTY 463 (2d
ed. 1971) ("bailee is liable for ordinary negligence or failure to observe ordinary
care, the care that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances").
181. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 44 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
182. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERiLO, THE LAW or CoNTRACTs § 2-12 (2d
ed. 1977).
183. Johnson v. Clark, 518 E2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1975). See also GEORGE G. BOGERT
& GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or TRusTs § 93 (5th ed. 1973).
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several areas, however, there has been some movement toward either a
different "objective" standard, the "reasonable woman," or to a more
individualized and subjective standard. These include tort law"s4 and,
significantly, the tort-like statutory cause of action for sexual harass-
ment,18 5 and criminal law, in particular the case of battered women
who assault or kill their batterers.'86
In each of these areas, the "reasonable man" or "reasonable person"
standard has come under increasing criticism in recent years for its
gender and class bias.' s7 A brief review of the critiques in these areas, as
well as of the changes that courts and commentators have proposed in
order to meet the criticisms, will help us to understand both the roots
of the problem in the innocent spouse area and the difficulties involved
in establishing a more satisfactory standard.
A. The Evolution of the Reasonable Man Standard
The "prudent and reasonable man" first appears in the common
law reports in 1856, in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. 8' He had
been preceded by the "man of ordinary prudence," first mentioned in
Vaughan v. Menlove in 1837.189 His twentieth-century English embodi-
ment, the man on the Clapham omnibus, arrived in 1933, in Hall v.
Brooklands Auto Racing Club,190 together with his suburban American
counterpart, "the man who takes the magazines at home and in the
evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves."1 91 The reasonable
woman, in contrast, is nowhere to be found in the common law reports
before the late twentieth century.
192
184. See infra text accompanying notes 202-224.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 225-261.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 264-293.
187. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lauyer's Primer in Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL.
EDUC. 3, 20-25 (1988).
188. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (1856).
189. Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837).
190. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 KB. 205, 224.
191. Ha 1 KB. at 224.
192. For a feminist critique of the reasonable man standard, see, e.g., Bender, supra note
187, at 20-25. On the development and history of the reasonable man concept, see
Collins, supra note 18; Green, supra note 18; James, supra note 18; Reynolds, supra
note 18; Austin, supra note 18.
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As has been pointed out elsewhere,'93 the "reasonable man" or
"reasonable person" 194 standard tends to reflect the ways in which white
middle-class men think and act, and to denote as "unreasonable" the
ways in which persons from other groups think and act. The maleness
of the standard is not unexpected, given that the large majority of cases
elaborating the standard have arisen from activities that, at least until
fairly recently, were primarily male,195 and that the large majority of the
judges deciding the cases have, until very recently, been male. 196
Even though one knows that the reasonable man standard does not
reflect reality, one could make an argument for the adoption of such a
standard in tort law in order to provide some workable rules for han-
dling the large volume of personal injury and other negligence cases
that arise every year. But the justification for such an inaccurate stan-
dard is considerably less in other areas of the law, where there would be
no particularly dire effects of adopting more flexible and realistic defini-
tions of reasonableness. In the case of innocent-spouse claims under
I.R.C. § 6013(e), for example, the adoption of a "reasonably prudent
taxpayer" standard 97 does not seem to have noticeably simplified the
task of the Tax Court judges evaluating such claims. Each case still
requires a fact-intensive inquiry and a construction by the court of the
hypothetical reasonably prudent taxpayer's response to the particular
facts and circumstances of the individual case. In contrast, many of the
cases in which the reasonable man appears in American jurisprudence 9 s
likely involve recurring and predictable situations. A simple, apparently
193. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Womens Issues in a
Torts Course, 1 YaE J.L. & FEMINisM 41, 57-65 (1989); Parker, supra note 19.
194. In most jurisdictions, references to the reasonable man have recently been supersed-
ed by the "reasonable person," a presumably genderless construct. Parker, supra note
19, at 108. The actual standard of conduct expected of this androgynous being, is
still based largely on the development of the reasonable man in the common law,
with the result that the standard continues to incorporate the previously explicit
male perspective of its predecessor. Parker, supra note 19.
195. Parker, supra note 19, at 109 (reporting on an analysis of New Zealand negligence
cases that showed most of them arising in commercial and industrial situations,
with males as the protagonists).
196. On the predominantly male makeup of the judiciary, see sources cited supra note
27.
197. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 E2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting
reason-to-know test of reasonable person in the taxpayer's subjective position);
accord, Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989).
198. See Austin, supra note 18, at 481 n.16 (reporting 23,320 occurrences of the reason-
able man in U.S. state cases as of December 3, 1991).
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objective rule for decision-making would be very useful in cases of rear-
end collisions, stairways in ill repair, or sponges left in the bodies of
surgery patients. Perhaps any "reasonable person" standard, whether a
single, genderless ideal or a collection of more particularized models, is
inappropriate in those areas of the law that demand a detailed examina-
tion of the specific facts and circumstances that arise from an individual's
actions in a situation unlikely to be repeated by others. Even if a general
rule exists (as it does in the innocent spouse statute), the application of
that rule in practice may not even be efficient.
One approach to the difficulties raised generally by the maleness of
the "reasonable man" or the "reasonable person" standard is the use of
a "reasonable woman" standard for matters where women's reactions or
behavior may be expected to differ from men's.199 As we shall see,
however, even this reform may not go far enough. Is there only one
reasonable woman or does a particular woman's reasonableness depend
on her background, education, class, race, and on the specific situation
in which she is asked to exercise that reasonableness?200 For that matter,
are there certain attributes of women's behavior that stretch the notion
of "reasonableness" beyond the breaking point, fatally diminishing the
utility of the concept?2
0 1
199. The outer boundaries of such an approach may not be easy to determine. For
example, Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. RLv. 95, 98-99
(1990), argues that the law's definitions of time, space, and causality are themselves
narrow, rigid, linear, and "white male." In Scales' view, women have a fundamental-
ly different sense of causality and time, one that is multiple, contingent, repetitive,
and cyclical. Scales, supra, at 109-10, 120. Accommodating such a fundamental
change in the notion of tort law causation might amount to a revolution in the
law's treatment of women, and might lead to predictable opposition from those
who would emphasize the need for certainty and predictability in legal rules, even if
the rules are wrong.
200. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. Rav. 1398, 1434 (1992) (discussing
the propensity of a single reasonable woman standard to mask differences among
women attributable to race, class, or employment experience).
201. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DomAm 73 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). Some feminist critics, howev-
er, fear that resort to such an alternative standard for women would reinforce the
very differences and subordinate position ascribed to women by the dominant male
structures of society. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist
Solidariy: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. Rav. 1, 39
(1990); Cahn, supra note 200, at 1402-03; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and
Changing. Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 9 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 195, 199-200 (1986).
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B. The Reasonable Woman in Tort Law
In its primary arena, negligence law, the "reasonable man" standard
served a variety of goals. It purported to reconcile the individual free-
dom essential to Western liberalism with society's needs for some
minimum level of protection for individuals to be free of the harm
caused by others, while at the same time creating a safe harbor for
individual variations-in effect, establishing the maximum permissible
legal limits of individual human failings.2"2 In addition, the "reasonable
man" standard in tort law had a number of socially useful and adminis-
tratively efficient functions.0 3 It provided a rule of conduct that was
conceivably within the grasp of most people and that could change over
time in response to changes in technology and in societal mores.0 4 The
"reasonable man" standard eliminated the need for the judiciary or the
government to elaborate detailed codes of prescribed behavior in a
variety of specific circumstances, subsuming all such rules within the
general rubric of reasonableness and waiting until specific facts emerged
in litigation to determine whether a specific behavior was in fact "rea-
sonable."20 5 At the societal level, the standard discouraged idiosyncrasy
and encouraged conformity, by holding out the threat of legal liability
for non-conforming behavior.20 6
Despite attempts to hide the gender-specific nature of the "reason-
able man" standard, either by arguing that "man" is a generic term for
human being, or by transmuting the term into "reasonable person," 20 7
the standard's maleness is clear. When Vaughn v. Menlove was decided
in England in 1837, no woman in the Western world had the right to
vote, and few had full legal rights with respect to property.208 Because
they lacked economic standing, women were unlikely to be named as
202. Parker, supra note 19, at 106.
203. Parker, supra note 19, at 106.
204. Parker, supra note 19, at 106-07.
205. Parker, supra note 19, at 107.
206. Parker, supra note 19, at 107.
207. Parker, supra note 19, at 108-110. See also Robert Unikel, Comment, WReasonable'
Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 326, 334 (1992).
208. Parker, supra note 19, at 108.
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defendants in tort actions.20 9 The rules that evolved in the common law
from those actions quite naturally reflected an exclusively male point of
view." The activities and actions of the typical negligence case were
male activities and actions.21 Even before one raises questions about
whether "reasonableness" is a term that is useful in resolving specific
conflicts between people (as contrasted to its utility in permitting an
efficient judicial system and in establishing societal norms of conduct),
one must at least acknowledge the male bias inherent in the standard.2 2
Typically, 19th-century cases held that a woman could not even meet
the "reasonable man" standard, belying any attempted gloss on the
word "man" to mean "human being."
213
While courts tended, in the more gender-conscious environment of
the 1970s, to move away from the overt use of "reasonable man" as a
standard,214 the resulting shift to "reasonable person" generally repre-
sented only a cosmetic change, as the substantive content of the standard
was still based predominantly on the experience of male litigants, as
interpreted by male judges.215 Advocates of this facially neutral standard
might argue that
[b]y refusing to establish one group's ideals as dominant and,
instead, relying on prevailing social norms for its definition,
the reasonable person standard approximates the objectivity
and neutrality that are ideally required by the concept of
"reasonableness." Unlike either the reasonable man standard
or the reasonable woman standard, the reasonable person
standard does not preordain an outcome.
216
209. Parker, supra note 19, at 108.
210. Parker, supra note 19, at 108.
211. Parker, supra note 19, at 108.
212. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 187, at 20-25; Cahn, supra note 200, at 1404.
213. See, e.g., Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32 (1873) (holding that a 20-year-old woman
could not be held to the "reasonable man" standard because women generally were
more like children than like men). In addition to using males as the standard of
reasonable behavior, tort law has also traditionally evaluated damage claims from a
male point of view. See, e.g., Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, 103 HAtav. L. Ray. 964, 970-71 (1990) (book review) (noting the
systematic under-valuation of female-specific injuries).
214. Unikel, supra note 207, at 334.
215. Bender, supra note 187, at 22.
216. Unikel, supra note 207, at 335 (footnote omitted).
1996]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Such pious, abstract thoughts run afoul of the actual application of the
reasonable person standard, which often perpetuates an exclusively male
viewpoint.217
Former Yale Law School dean and now appellate judge Guido
Calabresi, a member of the generally white, male, and upper-class legal
establishment, has questioned whether a key function of the reasonable
person standard is to promote conformity to the male, WASP paradigm
of behavior. 218 The notion that there is a single Platonic archetype of
the "reasonable person" implies that those who differ from that arche-
type, as it is interpreted in the context of centuries of male shaping of
the common law, are somehow undeserving of the law's protection.
The law of fright and the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress provide a specific example of the courts' imposition of a gender-
specific standard in tort law and the gradual evolution of that standard
to reflect gender differences. Early emotional-distress cases required a
physical impact as a pre-requisite to any recovery. Martha Chamallas
and Linda K. Kerber have noted that this requirement has different
implications for men and women:
[Tihe legal rules that emerged from the opinions were worded
neutrally. But the fright-based injuries themselves at issue in
the classic cases were not gender-neutral. Miscarriage, prema-
ture birth and "hysterical" disorders described women's health
problems; the case law administering the impact rule was
necessarily the law's administration of redress for gender-relat-
ed harms. 219
In these cases, the "normal" or reasonable response to fright was a male
response; women's injuries, like miscarriages, premature births or other
217. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 E2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding,
after applying the reasonable person standard, that supervisor's obscenities and
pornographic posters in the workplace did not amount to actionable sexual harass-
ment "when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly
features and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at
the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public
places").
218. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ArrrruDEs, AND THE IAW. PRIVATE LAw
PE.spEcnvEs ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 26-28 (1985).
219. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright, 88
MICH. L. Rav. 814, 832 (1990).
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fright traumas, were often held to be abnormal, hypersensitive, or
unreasonable.220
Eventually, some courts recognized the woman-specific injuries
caused by fright and reversed the impact rule, permitting women to
recover for emotional distress where they witnessed the death or injury
of their children.221 This result, while not going as far in recognizing
the validity of some women-specific injuries as some might think desir-
able,222 does at least demonstrate the possibility of progressive case-law
development that takes a male-oriented reasonableness rule and then
changes that rule to accommodate the real responses of women.
A further extension of the recognition of group-specific characteris-
tics of tort plaintiffs might provide recovery for such varieties of inflic-
tion of emotional distress as the abuse or harassment of employees (in
addition to statutory remedies under Tide VII, discussed below) 223 or
the emotional effect of hate speech.224 Such an extension of traditional
tort concepts would threaten the carefully constructed edifice of tort
law, but would also make the legal system more responsive to the real
injuries suffered by real people, even if such people did not share a
white, male, middle-class viewpoint.
220. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 219, at 832-33. See also Leslie Bender, An Over-
view of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CoREu. L. Rav. 575, 578 (1993).
221. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 925 (Cal. 1968).
222. See, e.g., Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 219, at 816.
223. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74
(1991), amended Tide VII to permit the awarding of compensatory damages for
emotional distress and other harms resulting from sexual harassment. On employ-
ment-related emotional distress as a tort, see Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1988); Alice Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. A Practi-
tioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rav. 879 (1980); Sarah E.
Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982); Krista J.
Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1461 (1986); Benson A. Wolman, Comment, Verbal
Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP.
U. L. Rav. 245 (1988).
224. On possible tort remedies for hate speech, see Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in MAya J.
MATTsuDA ET Ar., WoRDs THAT WOUND 89 (1993); Jean C. Love, Discriminatory
Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WAsH. & LEE L.
REv. 123 (1990).
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C. Sexual Harassment Law225
Perhaps the most complete development of a "reasonable woman"
construct has been in the law of sexual harassment, under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.226 This law prohibits discrimination in the terms
225. The following text is only a brief discussion of the development of the reasonable
woman standard in sexual harassment litigation. For more detailed analysis, see
CATHAUNE A. MAcKrNNoN, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in
FEMNISM UNMODIFIED 103 (1987); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989); Robert S.
Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal Ethical and Social Implications of the "Reason-
able Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FoiRtHi L. Rav. 773
(1993); Eileen M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law
and the Case for Subjectivity, 16 VT. L. REv. 1005 (1992); Martha Chamallas,
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Litigation, 1 Tx. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992); Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply
Unbelievable: Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 10
LAw & INEQ. J. 285 (1992); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless
Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YAL L.J. 1177
(1990); Elizabeth A. Glidden, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in Combating
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IowA L. REv. 1825 (1992); Paul B.
Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illsion?, 28
WAKE Fostxsr L. REv. 619 (1993); Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the
Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB. L.J. 203 (1992); Wendy Pollack, Sexual
Harassment: Womens Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HLv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35
(1990); Howard A. Simon, Ellison v. Brady: A "Reasonable Woman" Standard for
Sexual Harassment, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 71 (1991); Bonnie B. Westman, The
Reasonable Woman Standard- Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 18
WM. MrrcHELL L. Rav. 795 (1992); Steven H. Winterbauer, Sexual Harass-
ment-the Reasonable Woman Standard, 7 LAB. LJ. 811 (1991); Saba Ashraf, Note,
The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard- An Evaluation of Its Use in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 21 HoFsTRA L Rav. 483 (1992); Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a
Woman's Point of View: The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 60 U. GIN. L REv. 1281 (1992); Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There
a Place fir a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DuKE L.J 855 (1993); Lynn Dennison,
Note, An Argument for the Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment
Claims, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (1993); Jeffrey A. Gettle, Comment, Sexual Harass-
ment and the Reasonable Woman Standard. Is It a Viable Solution?, 31 DuQ. L. REv.
841 (1993); Sally A. Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassmentfrom the Victim' Perspec-
tive: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77
MARQ. L. REv. 85 (1993); David L. Pinkston, Note, Redefining Objectivity: The
Case for the Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, 1993
B.Y.U. I Ray. 363; Unikel, supra note 207.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
[Val. 3:421
INNOCENT SPOUSES AND THE IRS
and conditions of employment on the basis of, among other things,
sex.227 The emergence of a gendered standard here has made it possible
for female plaintiffs to prevail in at least some situations where applica-
tion of a "reasonable man" or even an androgynous "reasonable person"
standard would not have permitted recovery.
Sexual harassment claims typically allege either quid pro quo
discrimination, in which on the job rewards are conditioned upon
providing sexual favors, or "hostile environment" discrimination, in
which the overall working situation is so antagonistic to women that it
amounts to discrimination. 228 In Meitor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,229 the
Supreme Court held that a "hostile environment" toward women workers
could form the basis for a Title VII claim.230 The test elaborated by the
Court was whether the conduct of the employer (including conduct
attributed to the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior) "has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment."231 Thus, the Meitor Court assumed, without
227. Sex was added to Title VII as a protected category in 1964, by way of a floor
amendment with little legislative history. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). Tide
VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
228. Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
229. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vmson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
230. Meritor 447 U.S. at 67. The Meritor decision built on a long line of cases holding
that Title VII reached something more than overt discriminatory denials of promo-
tion or fiailure to hire. See, e.g., Caiddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568
F.2d 87,88 (8th Cit. 1977) (dealing with national origin discrimination); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.) (racial
discrimination), cent, denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines E., 545
F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (racial discrimination); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cit. 1971) (racial discrimination), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972);
Compston v. Borden, 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religious
discrimination). Prior to the decision in Meritor, a number of lower federal courts
had reached a similar conclusion regarding sex discrimination. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dufndee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cit. 1981);
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 783-84 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
231. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.ER. § 1604.11(a)(3)).
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discussing the issue, that there could be a universal, "objective" standard
of reasonableness by which behavior could be evaluated.
In its only other pronouncement on hostile environment sex
discrimination, Harris v. Forklift Systems, 32 the Supreme Court, in
contrast to its opinion in Meritor, appears to have accepted the notion
that reasonableness may be a gendered construct. Although the actual
holding of the case is phrased passively and androgynously, 2"1 the Court
refers at least once to whether the work environment would be per-
ceived as hostile to a reasonable woman.234 The opinion in Harris,
however, also refers a number of times to the perception of a "reason-
able person," 5 leaving it uncertain whether, were the Court squarely
presented with the issue of gendered reasonableness, the sanitized lan-
guage of "reasonable person" would prevail over any more explicitly
gendered conception.
Pending such an authoritative pronouncement from the Supreme
Court, the lower federal courts and some state courts have disagreed as
to the appropriate standard for determining whether a particular work
environment is hostile and abusive. 6 While a few courts have explicitly
232. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
233. The standard is whether the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. The actual issue decided
in Harris was whether the conduct in a hostile environment discrimination case
must "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being," or merely create a
hostile environment. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The Court held that a psychological
effect was not required, Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371, thereby resolving a split of
authority among the circuits. See Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Downes v. F.A.A., 775 F.2d 288,
292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (all holding that a psychological well-being effect was required
to state a claim under Title VII); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir.
1991) (psychological effect not required).
234. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (noting that the district court had found that the employ-
er's conduct "would offend the reasonable woman").
235. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-72 (Scalia, J., concurring).
236. The full test of whether a plaintiff states a daim for sex discrimination involves five
elements: (1) whether the plaintiff is in a protected category (e.g., a category
defined by sex); (2) whether the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harass-
ment; (3) whether the harassment was based on sex; (4) whether the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) whether the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt,
effective remedial action (respondeat superior). Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20. See aho
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 66-69; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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adopted a gender-neutral "reasonable person" perspective, 37 the majori-
ty have adopted either a "reasonable woman"238 or a "reasonable vic-
tim"239 standard.
A few of the leading cases illustrate the specific standards that have
been adopted, and how these standards have influenced the outcome in
each case. For example, in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref Co., the Court of
Application of a "reasonable woman" or "reasonable person" test goes to the fourth
of these elements.
In addition, most courts that have considered sexual harassment require that the
plaintiff show both that the work environment is objectively hostile and abusive, by
reference to some hypothetically reasonable plaintiff, and that the environment was
subectively perceived as hostile by the particular plaintiff. Saxton v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483; Jenson
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1993); Smolsky v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The subjective
requirement obviously places more resilient, less "sensitive" women at a disadvan-
tage. See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 807 F. Supp. 506, 508-09 (N.D.
Iowa 1992) (finding that plaintiff did not subjectively perceive a blatantly chauvinist
workplace as abusive and hostile largely because the plaintiff had, prior to com-
mencing employment, posed nude for a national magazine), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959
(8th Cit. 1993). A few courts have adopted an exclusively objective test. See, e.g.,
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 458 (N.J. 1993).
237. See, e.g., Rabidue, 805 E2d at 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 164-67 (Mich. 1993). In Radtke, the
Michigan Supreme Court expressly rejected the "reasonable woman" standard that
had been adopted by a lower appellate court. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 165. The
Michigan case was interpreting a statute, MIcH. CoMv. LAws ANN.
§ 37.2202(1)(a), dosely modeled on Tide VII, but which explicitly recognized
"hostile environment" as a basis for a daim. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2103(h)(iii) (West 1985).
238. Andrews, 895 E2d at 1486 ("women of reasonable sensibilities"); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir.
1987); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cit. 1985);
Smolky, 780 F. Supp. at 294; Austen v. State of Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628
(D. Haw. 1991); Toys 'R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 453-54, 457-58.
239. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 E2d 533, 537 (7th
Cit. 1990); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 ("reasonable person of the same sex in that
position"); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 429 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("reasonable
person of the same gender and race or color"); Smolsky, 780 F. Supp. at 294; Harris
v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 n.12 (D. Me. 1991) ("reason-
able person from the protected group of which the alleged victim is a member"),
vacated in part, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991). In some cases, the court is
unclear whether it is adopting a "reasonable woman" or "reasonable victim" stan-
dard. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879-80. In practice, virtually all sexual harass-
ment complaints are brought by women, so that the distinction may be of little
practical importance.
1996]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the following test of whether
profanity, obscenity, and the like in the workplace amounted to hostile
environment sexual discrimination:
[T]he trier of fact... must adopt the perspective of a reason-
able person's reaction to a similar environment under essen-
tially like or similar circumstances. Thus, in the absence of
conduct which would interfere with that hypothetical reason-
able individual's work performance and affect seriously the
psychological well-being of that reasonable person under like
circumstances, a plaintiff may not prevail ... regardless of
whether the plaintiff was actually offended by the defendant's
conduct. 240
In Rabidue, the plaintiff, who worked in an overwhelmingly male
shipyard, argued that repeated obscenities directed at her by a co-worker,
and exposure to workplace pornography, amounted to sex discrimi-
nation.z" The court, apparently relying on its view of what the
hypothetical reasonable person would think, held otherwise.
In Radtke v. Everett, the plaintiff argued that an attempted forcible
sexual encounter by her boss amounted to sexual harassment.2" The
lower court applied a "reasonable woman" standard for evaluating
whether the boss's attempt to restrain the employee on a couch and kiss
her amounted to actionable harassment.243 The Michigan Supreme
Court reversed, however, holding that whether a particular work envi-
ronment was "hostile," "intimidating," or "offensive" should be deter-
mined by an "objective" reasonableness standard, rather than by the
subjective perceptions of a particular plaintiff, as had been argued by
Ms. Radtke. z 4 The Michigan court held that a supposedly gender-
neutral "reasonable person," expressly incorporating the long case law
history of the reasonable man, should be used to apply this "objective"
240. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref Co., 805 F2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). The Rabidue
court's requirement for actual effect on work performance or actual psychological
harm was overturned by the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
241. Rabidue, 805 E2d at 615.
242. Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. App. 1991), rev'd, 501 N.W.2d 155
(Mich. 1993).
243. Radtke, 471 N.W.2d at 664.
244. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164-65.
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standard. The court stated that any deviation from a facially gender-
neutral approach was a matter for the legislature and not the courts.245
In contrast, a number of cases, many of them drawing on Judge
Damon Keith's forceful dissent in Rabidue,246 explicitly adopt the
perspective of a "reasonable woman." For example, in Lehmann v. Toys
"R' Us, Inc.,247 the New Jersey Supreme Court, interpreting a statute
modeled on federal law, adopted a "reasonable woman" standard. The
court held that: "[t]o state a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, a female plaintiff must allege conduct that.., a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment."24 Thus the court adopted a supposedly
objective standard, but one that has a gendered content.2 9 The principal
justification for such a gendered standard was that the use of supposedly
gender-neutral standards might serve to perpetuate discrimination and
offensive behavior that was built into the day-to-day fabric of the
workplace, while the purpose of the sex discrimination statute was to
force changes in that pattern of behavior.
In addition to these two standards in sexual harassment cases, a
number of courts have attempted to craft even more specific rules that
incorporate characteristics of the plaintiff that go beyond gender.2 5' In
Harris v. International Paper Co., the U.S. District Court in Maine
adopted a standard of evaluating the workplace environment from the
point of view of "the reasonable person from the protected group of
which the alleged victim is a member" in a racial discrimination case. 2
And in Stingley v. Arizona, the district court adopted a standard of
245. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d. at 165-66.
246. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 E2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (NJ. 1993).
248. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 453.
249. The New Jersey court held that if a sexual discrimination plaintiff were male, the
standard to be applied would be that of the "reasonable man." Toys R" Us, Inc., 626
A.2d at 458.
250. Toys "R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 458.
251. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), vacated in part,
765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) (discussing racial harassment); Stingley v.
Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992) (discussing racial and sexual harass-
ment).
252. Harris, 765 E Supp. at 1516 n.12.
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viewing the alleged hostile environment from the point of view of "'a
reasonable person of the same gender and race or color."'
253
While no clear consensus has yet emerged in the sexual harassment
cases as to the applicable standard for evaluating whether a particular
work environment is reasonably perceived as hostile, offensive or intimi-
dating, there is ample evidence that many, if not most, courts are
rejecting easy reliance on the traditional "reasonable man." Courts are
groping for a standard that more accurately reflects both the differences
among plaintiffs and the remedial aims of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion.
As the cases and commentators addressing sexual harassment have
often noted, the principal justification for a gendered standard is simply
that, in general, men and women tend to view the same actions
differently, as a result of their socialization and as a result of their
appropriately differing perceptions of the dangers associated with sexual
aggression.25 Numerous courts have commented that what many men
would find unobjectionable may reasonably be perceived as offensive by
women.
255
The standards described above all reflect the appeal that some
concept of reasonableness has for the courts. They hold out the hope
that courts may be able to decide cases by applying some external rule
to a limited set of legally relevant facts, rather than being compelled to
delve into the messy particulars of the specific situation. In fact, at least
one court argued that the adoption of an objective standard alone,
without requiring any analysis of the claimant's subjective perception of
her work environment, actually benefits women:
[A]n extraordinarily tough and resilient plaintiff might face
harassing conduct that was, objectively viewed, sufficiently
severe or pervasive to make the working environment hostile
253. Stingley, 796 E Supp. at 428-29 (following Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
254. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 225, at 1205 ("American women have been raised in a
society where rape and sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels ....
Because of the inequality and coercion with which it is so frequently associated in
the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality in an unexpected context or a
setting of ostensible equality can be an anguishing experience.").
255. Eison, 924 E2d at 878; Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 E2d 881, 898
(1st Cir. 1988); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987). See
also Ehrenreich, supra note 225, at 1207-08; Abrams, supra note 225, at 1203
(asserting that males view sexual harassment as "comparatively harmless amuse-
ment," and that this view is expressed in many court opinions).
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or intimidating, but because of her toughness, she might not
personally find the workplace hostile or intimidating. Under
our [purely] 9bjective standard, such a plaintiff would state a
claim even if she personally did not experience the workplace
as hostile or intimidating... Sexual harassment is illegal even
if the victim is strong enough not to be intimidated.'
Certainly, the requirement for an evaluation of the claimant's
subjective response to an admittedly "objectively" hostile work environ-
ment can, at a minimum, impose additional litigation burdens. For
example, in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,257 a hostile-environment class
action, the court required each individual class member to prove that
she was "as affected as the reasonable woman" by the employer's ac-
tions.2 58
On balance, adoption of a "reasonable woman" or "reasonable
victim" standard in sexual harassment cases has likely made it easier for
women to recover in sexual harassment cases. This is especially true
where courts recognize that the construct of a reasonable woman is not
monolithic, as Judge Marie Garibaldi of the New Jersey Supreme Court
did in Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc.:
The category of reasonable women is diverse and includes
both sensitive and tough people. A woman is not unreason-
able merely because she falls toward the more sensitive side of
the broad spectrum of reasonableness. Nor should "reason-
able" be read as the opposite of "emotional." Perhaps because
"reasonable" contains the word "reason," some have interpre-
ted reasonableness as requiring a Vulcan-like rationality and
absence of feeling. The reasonable woman standard should
not be used to reject as unreasonable an emotional response
to sexual harassment. On the contrary, such a response is
normal and common.259
256. Toys YR' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 458.
257. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
258. Jenon, 824 F Supp. at 876.
259. Toys "R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 458. Judge Garibaldi also pointed out, as have many
academic commentators, that the reasonable person standard, despite its apparent
gender neutrality, tends to be male-biased, as a result of the courts' general tenden-
cy to view a male perspective as normal. Toys R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 459.
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Some commentators on recent developments in sexual harassment
cases have expressed the fear that, as Judge Garibaldi noted, a single,
supposedly objective, "reasonable woman" standard might still leave
many women devoid of protection, because their personal characteristics
fail to conform to the posited standard.260 On the other hand, the
proliferation of ever more precise standards, as in the Stingley court's
"reasonable person of the same gender and race or color,"2 11 runs coun-
ter to the desire of courts for simplicity and predictability in handling
numerous largely similar cases. Use of more specific standards also raises
the question of whether the trier of fact in these cases can put himself
(or less frequently herselo in the position of the victim to the extent
necessary to make a fair evaluation of the circumstances from the
victim's perspective.
Nonetheless, the use of a "reasonable woman" standard in the
sexual harassment cases undoubtedly represents a significant improve-
ment over the prior, ostensibly gender-neutral, "reasonable person"
standard. Despite the uncertainties associated with implementing the
reasonable woman concept, it clearly provides a vehicle for making the
working environment more woman-friendly than it would otherwise be.
If applied to tax law in general, and the innocent spouse statute in
particular, the substitution of the same sort of reasonable woman's
perspective that we have seen in the sexual harassment cases in place of
the reasonably prudent taxpayer (a clearly male construct) now embod-
ied in the case law would likely cause judges to pay somewhat more
attention to the context of the situations that present themselves as
innocent spouse petitions. They might stop for a moment and ask
whether the response of this particular woman in signing a return
without carefully reviewing it, or in accepting her husband's assurances
that all the deductions must be legitimate because, after all, the accoun-
tant prepared the return was, from the point of view of a woman in her
position, reasonable. The extent to which even such a substitution,
however, could erase the hyper-rational model of the prudent taxpayer
embodied in current law seems somewhat problematic.
260. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 225, at 1214 ("Courts also should consider the exploi-
tation of sensitivities arising from socialization as a woman of a particular racial,
ethnic or socio-economic group.").
261. Stingley v. Arizona, 796 E Supp. 424, 429 (D. Ariz. 1992).
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D. Standards for Criminal Responsibility
The other principal area of law in which the concept of a
reasonable woman has developed is in the field of criminal law
generally, and in the defense of battered women in particular. For
example, the Model Penal Code proposed by the American Law
Institute would establish a defendant-specific model of reasonableness:
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: ... (b) a
homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them
to be.262
The Code's proposed standard adopts the point of view of the specific
actor while requiring some minimal degree of reasonableness, as
determined from the actor's point of view. The standard asks: what do
triers of fact know of the particular individual's situation, and how
might she act in that situation, given all that has occurred to her?
While the criminal law requirement of mens rea263 bars holding
defendants to an abstract, generalized standard of reasonableness, the
subjective modification of a general reasonable-person standard
suggests that the criticisms of a "reasonable woman" standard as
unworkable have not convinced all elements of the legal community.
If the trier of fact in a criminal case can adopt the "viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation," then why should it not be possible
for a trier of fact in a variety of civil-litigation settings, including tax
law, to adopt the presumably more general viewpoint of the
"reasonable woman"?
The acceptance of a more particularized standard of
reasonableness and responsibility in the criminal law in general is
reflected in the specific area of battered women who kill or attack
262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
263. See WYNE R. LAFAvE, PRINCIPLES OF CRImINAL LAw 60-61 (1978).
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their abusive husbands or lovers.26 4 The battered woman's defense has
developed out of the self-defense doctrine.
265
A person has the right to use deadly force in self-defense if that
person reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death
or, in some states, danger of serious bodily harm, and that the use of
deadly force is necessary to avoid this danger.266 The applicable standard
contains three elements: (1) the defendant must honestly and reasonably
have believed that she was in imminent (or immediate) danger of death
or serious bodily harm, from which she could not save herself without
using deadly force; (2) the defendant must have availed herself of all
reasonable means to avoid physical combat before using deadly force;
and (3) the defendant must have used no more force than was reason-
ably necessary in the circumstances. 267
The rule raises difficulties for the repeatedly battered woman who,
fearing a resumption of violence, attacks her spouse or lover while he is
sleeping or his back is turned. 26" As Cynthia Gillespie has noted:
The law of self-defense is a law for men. It developed over
many centuries in response to two basic kinds of situations
264. For a more detailed discussion of the development of the concept of reasonableness
as part of battered women's defense strategies, see CYNTmA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIPI-
ABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAw 129-56 (1989);
Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv.
603, 612-22 (1994); Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered
Womens Defense:" Towards a New Understanding, 19 FoIRHAM URB. L.J. 567
(1992); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defnse: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L REv. 379 (1991); Victoria M. Mather,
The Skeleton in the Closet: the Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert
Testimony, 39 MERCER L Rav. 545 (1988); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity
and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse,
67 N.Y.U. L REV. 520 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Repre-
sentation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault,
4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149 (1978).
The leading studies of the so-called "battered women's syndrome," which has
been used by-many courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a woman's actions in
defending herself against an abusive male, are LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN (1979) and LENORE E. WAIdR, TERRIFYING LOV: WHY BATrERED
WOMEN KILL AND How Socimy RESPONDS (1989).
265. Dowd, supra note 264, at 574-75.
266. IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAw OF SELF-DEFENSE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 1
(1987).
267. Boland, supra note 264, at 612-13.
268. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R-C.L L. REv. 623, 633-34 (1980).
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that men found themselves in. The first was the sudden as-
sault by a murderous stranger, such as when someone, per-
haps bent on robbery, comes out of a dark alley with a gun
and threatens to kill a person walking innocently down the
street. The second is the fist fight or brawl that gets out of
hand and suddenly turns deadly. Usually this is the sort of
bar-fight situation where both participants willingly enter into
a punching match; and one of them, believing he is losing,
suddenly pulls out a weapon and threatens to kill the other.26 9
The bar-room brawl model, however, does not make the applica-
tion of the self-defense rules problematic for all battered women. Be-
tween seventy and ninety percent of all battered women who kill do so
when faced with an ongoing physical attack or the imminent threat of
death or serious injury, rather than an attack on a man momentarily
incapacitated by sleep or alcoholic stupor.270
A minority of states require a woman to justify the use of deadly
force by demonstrating a threat of "immediate," rather than "immi-
nent" harm.271 States using the imminence test are more receptive to
evaluating a battered woman's defense in the context of her overall
situation and to admitting expert evidence on the effect of the battered
women s syndrome on the particular defendant.
272
Both of these standards presume something in the nature of a bar-
room brawl between two male antagonists. Moreover, the bar-room
brawl analogy posits the stereotypical aggressive male reaction as "rea-
sonable."273 Women were viewed as inherently unreasonable, hysterical,
emotional, or intuitive.274
Prior to the 1970s, women who killed abusive husbands or lovers
generally pled guilty or pled insanity and were routinely convicted. 5
Beginning, however, with State v. Wanrow2 76 in 1977, a more specific
woman-focused standard of responsibility has become common.
269. GIaapSE, supra note 264, at 4.
270. Maguigan, supra note 264, at 384-85.
271. Maguigan, supra note 264, at 464-67.
272. Dowd, supra note 264, at 580; Maguigan, supra note 264, at 414-15.
273. See Collins, supra note 18, at 323 (female traits have traditionally been viewed in
law as the antithesis of reasonableness).
274. Schneider, supra note 268, at 624-30.
275. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 264, at 149.
276. State v. Wanrow, 538 P2d 849 (Wash. App. 1975), affid 559 P12d 548 (Wash.
1977).
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In Wanrow, a five-foot four-inch-tall woman, wearing a cast and
using crutches to get around, was convicted of second-degree murder
for shooting and killing a six-foot two-inch tall intoxicated man who
broke into the house where she was staying, apparently because the
jury, on instructions from the trial judge, found Wanrow not to have
satisfied the objective standard of reasonableness.2 ' The Washington
Court of Appeals reversed.27 That reversal was affirmed by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, which held that the traditional "objective"
standard applied to defendants in determining whether their actions
met the legal test for self-defense should, at least in the case of women,
be replaced by a standard that instructs the jury to view a woman's
actions "in the light of her own perceptions of the situation, including
those perceptions which were the product of our nation's 'long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. ' 2 9
Similarly, in State v. Kelly, the defendant and her husband had an
argument, involving at least some degree of violence on his part, in the
street.280 Immediately thereafter, Kelly left the scene of the argument
and went to find her daughter.28' She was then approached by her
husband, who ran toward her with his arms raised.28 2 In the ensuing
scuffle, she pulled out a pair of scissors and stabbed him to death.28 3
Kelly was convicted of reckless manslaughter in the trial court, but the
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should
have permitted Kelly to introduce expert testimony regarding her status
as a battered woman. 24 Kelly had argued that the testimony would
have tended to show that her actions in pulling out the scissors when
confronted by her abusive husband were reasonable, if looked at from
the point of view of a battered woman.8 5
In these and many similar cases, courts have begun to move in the
direction of establishing a test for self-defense that asks whether a
"reasonable battered woman" would have acted as the particular
277. Wanrow, 559 P2d at 555.
278. Wanrow, 538 P.2d at 849.
279. Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 559 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973)).
280. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (NJ. 1984).
281. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
282. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
283. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368-69.
284. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375-81.
285. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369, 378.
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defendant did in fact act. 86 The reasonableness test that has evolved in
the case of battered women contains both objective and subjective ele-
ments-the defendant must have an honest, subjective apprehension of
imminent or immediate bodily harm and her apprehension must be
reasonable.1 7 What is "reasonable," however, is not entirely clear. At
least three formulations have been used: (1) a gender-neutral "reason-
able person" standard that considers "all the circumstances surrounding
the participants at the time of the incident," including their characteris-
tics and interpersonal history;88 (2) a "reasonable woman" standard that
emphasizes the generic differences between men's and women's reason-
able perceptions of harm from a particular set of circumstances; 289 and
(3) a "reasonable battered woman" standard that recalls the "reasonable
victim" approach of sexual harassment law, creating subcategories of the
gender archetypes and specifically incorporating the well-established
evidence that a history of battering changes the ways in which the
victim perceives the world.29' Each of these standards would clearly
produce different results in practice. The reasonable person would be
held to the historical standard of the bar-room brawl or the unexpected
and sudden assault; the reasonable woman would, as perhaps Yvonne
Wanrow was, be evaluated in the light of women's generally lesser
286. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (endorsing a separately
defined standard of the "reasonable battered woman" to be applied where a woman
who can show that she was in fact battered claims self-defense); accord, State v.
Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161, 173 (Wis. 1983).
287. Boland, supra note 264, at 614. A minority of states require only one or the other
element, though no state apparently permits the defendant to choose between a
subjective and an objective standard. See SLoAN, supra note 266, at 55-95 (survey
of state laws).
288. Dowd, supra note 264, at 571. See also Mather, supra note 264, at 571.
289. Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality frr Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HAnv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 152 (1985); Mather, supra note 264, at
573. See also Maguigan, supra note 264, at 402-05. Use of the reasonable woman
standard, however, in battered women's cases is subject to the same criticisms-that
it stereotypes women and reinforces the perception of them as helpless, while
excluding from its protection those women who are insufficiently "female-as in
the case of the sexual harassment standard. See Dowd, supra note 264, at 572;
Mather, supra note 264, at 573.
290. Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 O. L. R.v. 393,
416 (1988); Mather, supra note 264, at 571-72. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 167, 179-80 (Cal. App. 1989); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J.
1984); Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949, 952 (Pa. 1981) (all dealing with
the relevance of a history of abuse to the defendant's self-defense claim).
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physical strength and stature. The reasonable battered woman would be
judged in the light of her altered perceptions of imminent threat that
are a direct result of her history as a victim.
As in other areas of law, however, it is not at all clear that there
should be a single self-defense standard applicable to all in the general
category of "battered women." There may be great differences, attribut-
able to race, class, age and other factors, in the ways in which a history
of battering occurs and in which that history systematically affects a
woman's perceptions.29'
Although one of the leading practitioners of battered women's
defense believes that a gender-neutral standard actually produces fairer
trials than the other formulations, 29 2 that conclusion may be a result of
the unwillingness of (especially female) jurors to think that they, as
women, might ever be in the unenviable position of the defendant. A
gender-neutral standard, which can encompass specific facts and circum-
stances, may permit a more favorable evaluation of a specific defendant.
In comparison to the "reasonable battered woman," the gender-neutral
formulation is particularly attractive to jurors, and avoids the difficulties
inherent in the limiting and reductive nature of the term "battered
woman."
293
Substitution of the "reasonable battered woman" or the "reasonable
woman" in place of the traditional reasonable man of self-defense law is
not wholly without risk. To the extent that such a standard permits
judges or juries to superimpose their own preconceptions of the arche-
typal woman on a case, instead of looking at the actual litigant, the
standard will treat some women unfairly for their failure to conform to
the trier of fact's stereotype. Nonetheless, the substitution of a gender-
specific standard is an improvement on the adamantly gender-neutral
formulation, clearly rooted in the historic "reasonable man" that previ-
ously prevailed in the criminal law.
III. APPLYING THE REASONABLE WOMAN
STANDARD TO TAX LAW
In both the sexual harassment cases and the battered women's self-
defense cases, the adoption of a gender-specific standard for evaluating
291. Schneider, supra note 264, at 548.
292. Dowd, supra note 264, at 571 n.18.
293. Maguigan, supra note 264, at 444-45; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1991); Schneider,
supra note 264, at 562-63.
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the reasonableness of women's behavior appears to have benefitted the
women involved more often than not. It is apparent that the reasonable
woman standard can be used in ways that both increase and decrease
women's access to what we might ordinarily think of as justice or
fairness. In sexual harassment cases, for example, the standard tends to
increase women's power in litigation, while in many, though not all, of
battered-women's cases, the "reasonable woman as victim" standard
requires women to conform to a predetermined and gender-inflected
ideal of behavior before the legal system will recognize their experience
as reasonable. 2
94
The gender of the actor or of the complainant is clearly relevant in
cases involving sexual harassment and battered wives and girlfriends. In
contrast, one might argue that there is no need for a gender-specific
standard in tax law. Men and women both earn money, and both are
presumed capable of understanding the need to fill out tax returns.
Why, one might ask, should there be a gender-conscious standard in
this area of law that appears so divorced from the day-to-day gender
differences that so clearly affect harassment and battery?
There are two answers. First, dealing with tax matters is a gendered
activity, at least within most marriages. Men are more likely to be
responsible for preparing the joint return, or supervising its preparation
by an accountant. Just as working is a gendered activity, for purposes of
sexual harassment law,295 so too is tax preparation in the context of
most marriages. At a minimum, adoption of a reasonable woman
standard or standards would acknowledge this reality.
In his own way, in deciding against Janet Bliss, Tax Court Judge
Whalen was using a "reasonable woman" standard. The judge had
decided that, at least when they are going through a divorce, women
generally conform to a stereotypical pattern. As he so delicately put it,
"it's difficult for me to believe that somebody didn't wake up and say
. . . 'what was the SOB making."' 291 I do not think Judge Whalen's
formulation is what feminists have in mind when they ask judges to
recognize the ways in which women's and men's experiences and
294. Cahn, supra note 200, at 1401. See also SusAN Esr cH, REAL RAPE (1987) (de-
scribing the behavior society expects from a woman who has been raped).
295. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 E2d 611, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the isolated posi-
tion of a woman employee in a predominantly male environment).
296. Transcript of Record at 295, Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522
(1993), affid, 59 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 1995).
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attitudes differ. But, like the holdings of the judges in some of the
battered women's self-defense cases, his ruling is an example of what
happens when judges are permitted to believe that they are applying
gender-neutral universal norms in a situation where nothing is gender-
neutral and where universals do not exist. In this case, and in other tax
cases, a "reasonable woman" standard, or, even better, a "reasonable
divorcing woman who has not worked outside the home" standard,
incorporating sociological and psychological findings on the real ways in
which such women are likely to behave, would have been better and
more fair than the standard Judge Whalen pulled out of thin air. Using
a "reasonable woman" standard may perpetuate an ideology of female
inferiority, where women are seen as "sensitive, fragile and in need of a
more protective standard."297 However, the costs incurred in perpetu-
ating this ideology are outweighed by the benefits of using a "reasonable
woman" standard.
Adoption of a "reasonable woman" standard or standards for tax
cases would also be a second-best or partial solution to the innocent
spouse problem for both sexes. The law could respond more fairly to
the reality of each group's experience either by eliminating the "know
or have reason to know" requirement of I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) or by
eliminating joint and several liability altogether.29 s But these more
radical remedies are unlikely to be enacted by Congress, as the Treasury
would likely portray both of them as posing severe threats to the fisc.
In contrast, the adoption of a reasonable woman standard for purposes
of the innocent spouse statute could be accomplished through the
courts, on a circuit-by-circuit basis, in exactly the same way that such a
standard has emerged in sexual harassment law.299 While it would not
eliminate the uncertainty and the occasional unfairness inherent in the
innocent spouse statute as a whole, using a reasonable woman as the
touchstone for analyzing and deciding these cases could not help but
improve the odds for women whose husbands have left them with the
tax bill.
297. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1992) (dedining to apply a
"reasonable woman" standard in a sexual harassment case).
298. See supra part ILA.1.
299. See supra part II.C.
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IV. THE REALITIES OF DIVORCE
Janet Bliss's story demonstrates the incongruence of a hyper-
rational model with the reality of someone undergoing a divorce. Judge
Whalen, summarizing his view of the evidence at the end of Janet's
trial, commented that:
[I]t's still an uphill battle I think for the petitioner in the
sense that, you know, despite her-or regardless of her edu-
cation, she was-this was a matter in litigation and she was
being represented by attorneys and clearly there was informa-
tion given to her which would have disclosed the nature of
these loan accounts...
[T]o some extent it gets to be a little incredible that ... Mr. Bliss
moves out and she continues to have unquestioning faith and
confidence that he would give her a [tax] return which was com-
pletely accurate and she would have no curiosity as to what his
income was .... [The normal course of events is that formerly
married or separated persons become very suspicious of one anoth-
er and-and, you know, hire investigators and refuse to believe
anything and are extremely curious as to the events and circum-
stances surrounding the other party....
[I]t's quite frankly very difficult for me to believe that some-
body didn't wake up and say, "Look, there are these loan accounts
and here's all this financial information and what was the SOB
making?" I mean, you know, that's-that's exactly what kind of
thing goes on and it's very difficult to believe that somebody
would have exhibited this much lack of interest in-or curiosity
about the financial affairs of somebody who was obviously not a
very nice person .... 300
Although Judge Whalen found Janet Bliss's behavior irrational under
these circumstances, the relevant sociological and psychological litera-
ture" 1 makes it abundantly clear that Janet's reaction was normal and
commonplace; many women in the midst of divorce proceedings rely
entirely on their lawyers, never themselves studying the documentation
that is produced during the proceedings. Judge Whalen apparently
300. Transcript of Record at 292-96, Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522
(1993), afftd, 59 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 1995).
301. See infra text accompanying notes 304-314.
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expected that any woman in the midst of a divorce would vigilantly
search out all her husband's assets.3 2 In theory, divorce is not necessari-
ly a factor that the Tax Court has held to create a greater duty of
inquiry in the "innocent" spouse. 3  Nonetheless, Judge Whalen's
comments probably reflect a widely held view of the typical divorcing
woman-a view that bears little relation to reality.
The leading study of women's reactions to the divorce process,
Lenore Weitzman's The Divorce Revolution,0 4 shows that women are
much less likely than men to focus on the economic aspects of divorce
and much more likely to focus on interpersonal issues.3 5 As an earlier
study of women's knowledge of family finances found:
Most women are no more involved with the economics of
their marriage than they are with the economics of the nation
or the world. They [are] ignorant about financial matters
even-perhaps especially-those that affect them most
directly. Being a "dutiful wife" seems to require sentiment and
loyalty that are somehow projected as being inconsistent with
concern with the woman's own financial protection.-" 6
302. Transcript of Record at 293-96, Bliss, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 522.
303. See, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1989); Streit v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 571 (1989); Hinds v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH)
104 (1988); McRae v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1560 (1988); Shapiro v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (1988); Bouskos v. Commissioner, 54
T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (1987); Guth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 878
(1987); Feingold v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 309 (1980); Hackney v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 420, 426 (1976) (all noting that divorce is a
factor to be taken into account).
304. LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DivoRCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). For
similar findings, see Rum SIDEL, ON HER OWN: GROWING UP IN THE SHADOW OF
THE AMERICAN DREAM (1990); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequak The
Economic Disaster ofDivorcefrr Women and Children, 21 FaM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Jana
B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L REv. 1103 (1989); Cynthia
Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker. A Discourse on Playing with Dols,
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 67 (1993).
305. WmrzmAN, supra note 304, at 313. Numerous commentators suggest that men
typically have a superior bargaining position in divorce cases, an advantage that is
enhanced by the application of so-called neutral legal rules. See, e.g., Ann L. Dia-
mond & Madeleine Simborg, Divorce Mediation' Strengths ... and Weaknesses,
CAL. L~w., July 1983, at 37; Janet Rifdn, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective:
Promise and Problems, 2 LAw & INEQ. J. 21 (1984); Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness
Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399 (1984).
306. CHESLER & GOODMAN, supra note 144, at 132.
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If, in fact, women aggressively pursued their economic interests in
divorce proceedings, as Judge Whalen seems to assume they will, then
one would expect the economic outcomes of divorce cases to reflect
that aggressive stance. But virtually all empirical studies reflect that
"[d]ivorce impoverishes women and the minor children in their house-
holds, both absolutely and in relation to their ex-husbands and fathers.
Although women's standard of living drops dramatically as a result of
divorce, men's standard of living typically improves."307 One study
shows that "divorced men experience a 42 percent rise in their standard
of living in the first year after the divorce, while divorced women (and
their children) experience a 73 percent decline." 308 These outcomes
reflect the fact that for husbands, but generally not for wives, money is
the bottom line; and husbands, but not wives, go after that bottom line
in a divorce proceeding. Women are usually at a disadvantage in these
proceedings because their husbands, as in Janet Bliss's case, typically
control the family money and are willing to fight to keep that control
even after the divorce.30
9
In addition, women may focus less on financial matters than men
in the divorce process because they are more often primary caregivers
for children and are often willing to give up financial benefits to ensure
obtaining custody of the children.
310
There is also ample evidence that many, perhaps most, women,
hesitate to become embroiled in disputes over financial issues:
Women are systematically convinced that they shouldn't try
to take over control of money. They are made to feel uncom-
fortable about it. They're very insecure about their decisions.
And one thing feeds on the other, and they feel stupid, and
they ARE stupid, and then because they are stupid, they think
they have no capacity to learn beyond that.
31
'
Even when the marriage has deteriorated, and a divorce proceeding is
underway, many women continue to trust their husband's word on
financial matters, perhaps as a way of maintaining some form of
307. Singer, supra note 304, at 1104.
308. WarrzMAN, supra note 304, at 323.
309. Lois BRENNER & ROBERT STEIN, GETTING YOUR SHARE: A WoMAN's GUIDE TO Di-
VORCE STRATEGIES 17 (1989).
310. See BRENNER & STEIN, supra note 309, at 99 (referring to husbands' threats to seek
child custody in order to obtain financial concessions).
311. CHESLER & GOODMAN, supra note 144, at 52.
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relationship with the former spouse.312 And even in the divorce
situation, because women often have a lower tolerance for conflict than
men,313 a woman may not investigate the about-to-be-ex-husband's
finances with the diligence that a (male) judge would expect of the
"reasonably prudent taxpayer."
Women, particularly those whose husbands have left them, typical-
ly cope with divorce with a combination of denial, avoidance and
ambivalence. 314 Many women may be slow to come to terms with the
reality that the divorce process is indeed going forward in court, and
that they need to take steps to protect their interests. They may tend to
show a greater commitment to the marriage, and to hope, sometimes
until the end of the divorce process and even beyond, that the marriage
can somehow be repaired.
This reality gap could be bridged by imputing the knowledge of
engaged representatives for purposes of the reasonableness standard of
§ 6013(e)(1)(C). After all, cannot one expect that women will rely on
their lawyers to represent their interests zealously in divorce proceed-
ings, and, in particular, to pursue the husband's financial assets? That is
certainly what Janet Bliss did when she relied on her lawyer to "take
care" of the financial aspects of her divorce. 5 But many women may
be no more likely to press their lawyers for information than they are to
press their spouses. Women's attitudes towards their (often male) law-
yers may mirror their diffidence in dealing with their husbands in
divorce cases.316 Among the factors that make it unlikely that a female
divorce client will, in fact, come to know all there is to know about her
husband's finances through the intermediary of her lawyer are: "the
client's expectation that the lawyer will 'step in and straighten things
out'; the client's attempt to avoid responsibility for making a decision;
. . . the client's inflated view of the legal profession; the client's low
self-esteem; and, finally, the attorney's psychological need to occupy a
312. WEITzmAN, supra note 304, at 313.
313. WErrzmAN, supra note 304, at 315.
314. John E Crosby, et al. The Grief Resolution Process in Divorce, 7 J. Divoaca, Fall
1983, at 3, 5-6.
315. Transcript of Record at 50, Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1993),
affd, 59 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 1995).
316. Ignorance of the law makes clients anxious and it also makes it difficult for them to
question their attorney's decision-making abilities. See generally James R. Elkins, A
Counseling Model for Lauyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NoTan DsAm L. Rav. 229
(1977).
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dominant role in the interaction."317 Often, in fact, lawyers may
attempt to increase their authority by "shielding" their clients from
involvement in proceedings, 318 or by taking over the decision-making
role without fully communicating the options to their clients.319 The
styles adopted by lawyers for these approaches to lessening client auton-
omy include the "leave it all to me" lawyer, who generally brushes aside
clients' questions and practically pats the client on the head, telling her
not to worry;320 the "boy am I busy" lawyer, who strongly communi-
cates to the client that she shouldn't impose on his busy schedule by
asking questions;321 and the "Arnie Becker" star lawyer, who tells clients
what a celebrity he is.322 All three of these types, and all possible per-
mutations of them, are easily recognized by anyone with experience
with the divorce bar.
Thus, any realistic view of the role that lawyers play in the divorce
process, combined with the evidence that women in the midst of di-
vorce proceedings are generally not active and aggressive in pursuing
their own economic interests, suggests that women will not get full
information from their lawyers. Women are positioned such that they
do not have access to the lawyer's understanding of the divorce issues,
much less to any complex position that the soon-to-be-ex-husband may
have taken on the final joint tax return. When combined with the fact
that the lawyers themselves may not be able to determine the financial
facts, it seems somewhat unreasonable to hold the client responsible for
the lawyer's imputed knowledge. Once again, Janet Bliss's case provides
a clear example of this reality; her own lawyer testified that he did not
understand Janet's husband to have been earning the income that the
husband eventually owned up to.323 How, in these circumstances, can it
be fair to assume that the lawyer's client had greater knowledge than
the lawyer himself?
While there are few, if any, other cases that involve the application
of the innocent spouse statute to a tax return that was executed in the
317. Elkins, supra note 316, at 236.
318. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659, 732 (1990).
319. Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model ofAttorney-Client Relationship: The Argument
for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 320-21 (1987).
320. BRENNER & STEIN, supra note 309, at 11-12.
321. BREmER & STEIN, supra note 309, at 13.
322. BREiER & STEmN, supra note 309, at 13-14.
323. Transcript of Record at 127, Bliss v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 522
(1993), affd 59 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 1995).
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midst of divorce negotiations, the particular situation of a divorcing
wife does illuminate the broader problem of creating a reasonableness
standard in innocent spouse cases. As long as we pretend that there is a
single reasonable person standard, judges will be able to insert their
own gender-based biases into the standard, asking, as did Henry
Higgins in My Fair Lady, "why can't a woman be more like a man?"3 2 4
But, even if we recognize that the existing standards are out of touch
with the social and psychological reality faced by most women, especial-
ly by women in the midst of the divorce process, what do we put in
the place of these unrealistic standards that will not denigrate and
disempower women, in the same way that Judge Whalen's ruling
misunderstood and demeaned Janet Bliss?
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
How could the inequities of the innocent spouse statute, as it is
applied in practice, be remedied? Possible solutions embody at least four
approaches. First, the concept of a reasonable woman could be explicitly
incorporated into the law. Second, the "no basis in fact or law" stan-
dard could be modified. Third, the arbitrary dollar limitations in the
statute could be enlarged or eliminated. Finally, joint and several liabili-
ty itself could be eliminated.
Within the existing structure of the Internal Revenue Code, there
is relatively little room for change, whether statutory or administrative,
that would substantially ameliorate the often unfair and even more
often unpredictable impact of joint and several liability. Nonetheless,
some minor tinkering with I.R.C. § 6013(e) would eliminate some
continuing sources of inequity.
A. Knowledge and Reason to Know
The most difficult problem arises with respect to the knowledge
issue in I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C). While determinations of a wife's actual
knowledge of an understatement of tax may be relatively easy, a deter-
mination of whether a wife had "reason to know" is fraught with
difficulty, both for the trier of fact and for the wife claiming innocent
spouse status. The reasonably prudent taxpayer model generally adopted
324. REx HAmsoN, I'm an Ordinary Man, on MY FMR LADY: OpiGiNn CAST Rcou,-
ING (Columbia Records 1959).
[Vol. 3:421
INNOCENT SPOUSES AND THE IRS
by the courts appears overly broad, insufficiently attuned to the actual
situation of most women, and susceptible to implementation by mostly
male judges in ways that reinforce an unrealistic view of the process by
which most people prepare and submit their tax returns.
A more realistic approach would be to replace "the reasonably
prudent taxpayer under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of
signing the return," 325 or even the slightly more nuanced "reasonably
prudent taxpayer, with the particular petitioner's knowledge of all the
relevant circumstances and bearing in mind her level of intelligence,
experience and education"32 with a specifically gendered standard. Such
a standard-perhaps the reasonable woman, or the reasonable working-
class woman, or the reasonable woman who is not employed outside
the home-would at a minimum permit those judges who so choose to
incorporate into their analyses of the cases some conception of how a
woman would react to a specific set of circumstances. The repeated
incredulity of judges faced with the fact that women sign tax returns
prepared by their husbands without substantial investigation suggests
that the reasonable person standard fails to offer much useful guidance;
a more specific standard, focusing attention on women's specific ways
of dealing with tax matters, would be fairer.
B. "No Basis in Fact or Law"
Second, the requirement that a claim of deduction, credit, or basis
have "no basis in fact or law"327 should either be repealed or, at a
minimum, significantly clarified. It is not at all clear what Congress
intended when the provision was enacted in 1984,32' and subsequent
case law has eliminated only some of the uncertainty, and in such a way
as to deny relief to many women on hyper-technical grounds. For
example, the case law that bars relief where some, but not all, of a
deduction is disallowed seems unnecessarily restrictive. 29 Also, the
325. Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989).
326. Sanders v. United States, 509 E2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975).
327. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1994).
328. See supra text accompanying note 106.
329. See, e.g., Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758 (1986) (some, but not all, of
claimed business deductions could not be substantiated and were therefore disal-
lowed; innocent spouse relief denied with respect to the disallowed portion).
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conflicting case law as to the meaning of "no basis in fact or law" leaves
taxpayers with no certainty as to whether their claim might be up-
held.3 °
The "grossly erroneous" restriction might be justified on the
grounds that the purpose of the innocent spouse statute is to prevent
overreaching by one spouse at the expense of the other. If there is some
legitimate uncertainty as to the outcome of a claim for a particular
deduction, there is no overreaching, but merely normally aggressive
reporting of one's tax position. If some positive version of innocence is
required, then perhaps this rationale makes sense, but if the aim of the
statute is to protect spouses who have been victimized by their hus-
bands, then such a strict requirement is not necessary.
C. Dollar Limitations
There seems to be little or no need for the dollar limitations that
bar some women from appealing for innocent spouse relief-the $500
minimum for understatements of tax33 and the additional requirement,
applicable to claims of deduction, credit, and basis, that the understate-
ment exceed a specified percentage of the petitioning spouse's in-
come.33 ' The dollar limitation is particularly harsh on low-income
women, for whom a $450 tax deficiency may create serious hardship.
For a better-off taxpayer, a $10,000 deficiency may be merely a bother-
some detail that will not force her to choose between paying the gov-
ernment and feeding her children. The percentage-of-income limitation
for claims of deduction, credit, and basis seems to have no logical
support, even if some dollar value minimum is desirable. Why should
that dollar value be only $500 in omitted income cases, but some
higher, and variable amount, in other cases? While the percentage-of-
income limit does create the appearance of fairness, in that it seemingly
relates to ability to pay, its impact may still be severe for lower-income
330. Compare, e.g., Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 E2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987) (where
deduction for worthless stock was taken in the wrong year, court found some basis
in fact or law for the claim and hence no innocent spouse relief), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988) with Shenker v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986) (no
basis in fact or law for claim of deduction for stock that became worthless in a year
other than the tax year at issue and innocent spouse relief granted), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 2460 (1987).
331. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (1994).
332. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) (1994).
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women. For example, a woman with an adjusted gross income of
$15,000 in the "preadjustment year"-would not be able to invoke
innocent spouse protection for a deficiency of less than $1,500 occa-
sioned by erroneous deductions taken by her ex-husband. For someone
with this level of income, a tax bill of $1,400 that just fails to meet the
threshold could be catastrophic.
It might be argued that the dollar limitations are justified by the
danger of opening floodgates of litigation. After all, the innocent spouse
provision already accounts for a significant number of cases, some fifty
or more annually in recent years. But this argument overstates the
danger. Of the estimated 10,000 divorced or separated women taxpay-
ers a year who each are required to pay for their spouses' deficiencies,
333
perhaps one percent go as far as filing a Tax Court petition or other-
wise contesting the deficiency. It is hard to imagine that eliminating the
dollar limitations would so overwhelm the Tax Court or the IRS that
the decline in tax administration would outweigh the gain in fairness.
D. Eliminating Joint Liability
None of the above remedies, however, addresses the disparity
between the supposedly remedial nature of the innocent spouse statute
and the plethora of discrete, specific rules and burdens for the petition-
er that have been enacted by Congress and further developed by the
courts. Instead of tinkering with the existing elements of the law,
Congress could more effectively support the underlying purpose of its
legislation by repealing I.R.C. §S 6013(e)(1)(A)-(C) and retaining only
the requirement that is now in I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D), that "taking
into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
other spouse liable for the deficiency... .,33' The result in any given
case would probably be no more unpredictable than it is today, and the
attention of the courts would be focused more directly on the underly-
ing legislative purpose.
At a more fundamental level, the problem that is addressed by the
innocent spouse statute is a direct result of the joint and several liability
that has been exacted as the price of filing a joint return and taking
advantage of the I.R.C. § 1(a) rate schedule.335 For reasons that have
333. See Beck, supra note 7, at 327.
334. I.RC. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1994).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
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been more than adequately explored elsewhere, 36 there is no particular
logical connection between the filing of a joint return, and holding each
of the joint filers liable for the tax due on the income of the other.
More than tinkering with the innocent spouse statute, the abolition of
joint and several liability would simply assign responsibility for payment
of tax where it belongs, with the earner of the income.
In addition, the abolition of joint and several liability, and the
introduction of a "household" return, independent of marital status,3 37
would more closely reflect the economic and social realities of American
households in the 1990s. Relatively fewer Americans live in traditional
marriages, and relatively more live in other domestic arrangements, than
in the past 3" In any event, it is clear from the stories of many of the
innocent spouses whose cases were discussed in this Article that the
existing statutory system severely penalizes many of those who try to
live their lives traditionally, staying at home and raising the children,
and letting their husbands take care of the finances. When women like
these get the deficiency notice from the IRS and find that they are
liable for their husband's tax bills, the message that is sent, if any, is
that adherence to conventional morality is a mistake, something that
only the innocent, naive and gullible will do. Is this really the message
that our tax laws should be sending? t
336. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 7, at 369-82 (rebutting arguments that the tax benefit of
income splitting on a joint return justifies the imposition of joint and several
liability).
337. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: a Fresh Look at Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983 (1993) (suggesting a revision of
the rate structure that would lower rates on "secondary" earners and raise rates on
"primary" earners in a household).
338. Frederick R. Schneider, Which Tax Unitfor the Federal Income Tax?, 20 U. DaYToN
L. Rnv. 93, 94-95 (1994).
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